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INTRODUCTION

Partnership law has developed little, if at all, since the adoption
of the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.)' nearly seventy-five years
ago. When a body of law stagnates, legal scholars typically lead the
charge for reform. Yet this has not happened with partnership law,
which seems to have assumed something of a "sacred cow" status in
the academic community.
There is now a "window of opportunity" for meaningful reform
of partnership law. Recently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws authorized a revision of the U.P.A.2
Work on this project should begin in the middle of 1987 and is likely
to last several years. Although the revision represents an excellent
opportunity for diverse scholarly commentary and influence, the past
practice of most scholars in the field of business association to neglect
or subordinate issues affecting partners suggests the probability of
only limited participation by academics in this re-evaluation of longstanding principles of partnership law.
The reverence accorded partnership law is not the product of
careful scrutiny. We need only look at the treatment of partnerships
in law school curricula to determine why so many students believe,
incorrectly, that the source of all meaningful rules governing partners
is the Internal Revenue Code. Introductory courses in business
associations often emphasize corporations and minimize or avoid
altogether treatment of partnership law. 3 Law review articles on
1. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1969).
2. This action is not the product of widespread demands for a revision of the U.P.A.
Instead, it was prompted by the work of a Subcommittee of the Partnership Committee of the
American Bar Association's Section on Corporation, Banking,. and Business Law. The
Subcommittee, which was chaired by Professor Harry J. Haynsworth, reversed the traditional
reluctance of the Bar to upset established principles of partnership law. In the spring of 1986,
the Subcommittee produced a comprehensive and very useful report. See U.P.A. REVISION
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ABA PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE, CORPORATE BANKING AND
BUSINESS LAW SECTION, Should the Uniform PartnershipAct be Revised? [hereinafter U.P.A.
REVISION SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].

3.
It is strange that decades marked by a proclaimed interest in the legal problems
of the individual and the disadvantaged would have witnessed a near total
abandonment of formal study of the business vehicles [agency and partnership]
most generally encountered by the average citizen. Even schools that nominally
retained business organizations or business associations courses seem to assume
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problems affecting partners are scarce;4 pages devoted to "business
topics" are assigned to more glamorous issues such as insider trading,
greenmail, hostile takeovers, and the fiduciary responsibilities of
directors. It is as if partners did not exist.
If partnership law were simply ignored, the neglect would affect
only the several million individuals who conduct their businesses
under this form of organization.' The harm is not limited to partners,
however, for a recurring theme in the literature concerning close corporations is that various aspects of partnership law, and in particular
the freedom it accords partners to alter statutory norms by agreement, may provide suitable models for reform of corporate law.6
Although the analogy between the needs of participants in close corthat the problems of the publicly held corporation . . . should monopolize the
attention of the classroom.
D. FESSLER, ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION FOR PERSONS IN QUEST OF PROFIT at XIX
(1986).
This problem is reflected in many casebooks. Fortunately, there are course materials
treating partnerships in some depth. See, e.g., A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS, & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION (1972); D. FESSLER, supra; R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS (1986); H. HENN, AGENCY-PARTNERSHIP
(1985); L. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1983).
4. One of the more competent law review treatments of partnership law may be found in
Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New PartnershipLaw, 36 MERCER L. REV. 443 (1985).
Georgia was the last state to adopt the Uniform Partnership Act.
5. Reliable and precise data on partnerships are difficult to obtain. Some evidence of the
popularity of this form of business organization may be gleaned from information compiled by
the Internal Revenue Service. Unfortunately, the information concerning partnerships does
not distinguish among general partnerships, limited partnerships, and other unincorporated
business associations. Using this expanded definition, there were nearly ten million
partnerships as of 1982. See Internal Revenue Service, Selected Statistical Series 1970-85, 4
STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., 82 (Table 5) (Spring 1985).
6. See, e.g., Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-TheNeed for More and
Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L. J. 1145, 1148 (1966) ("Associates in a close corporation wish
"); Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy
to assume partnership characteristics ....
PartnershipAdvantages. Planningfor the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 427
(1953) (recognizing recent emphasis on the question of "how a business, once incorporated,
can nonetheless enjoy partnership advantages"); Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and
Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63
VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1977) (The close corporation is the "functional equivalent" of a
partnership.); Hornstein, Stockholders Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE
L.J. 1040, 1040 (1951) (Stockholders in close corporations "generally prefer certain of the
attributes of partnership, particularly with respect to control and dissolution."); Israels, The
Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 488 (1948) ("[Tlhe participants [in a
close corporation] consider themselves 'partners' and seek to conduct the corporate affairs to a
greater or lesser extent in the manner of a partnership."); id. at 491 (The "objective of the
participants in a close corporation is to equate the scheme of governance of their enterprise to
that of a partnership."); O'Neal, Preventive Law: Tailoring the CorporateForm of Business to
Ensure Fair Treatment of All, 49 MISS. L.J. 529, 533 (1978) ("Businessmen forming a close
corporation frequently consider themselves partners; they incorporate only to obtain limited
liability or other corporate advantages.").
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porations and partnerships is apt, partnership law requires much
closer study than it has received to date to determine whether the
legal principles under which partners operate would prove better sub7
jects than models for reform.
What accounts for the neglect and sacred cow status of partnership law and why are partners less deserving of attention than shareholders, directors, or parties to simple, discrete contracts? Several
explanations may be offered. The most obvious is that all problems of
partnership law have been solved. If nothing else, partnerships and
the law affecting these ventures have survived the tests of time and
geography. The partnership is probably the oldest form of business
organization.' The U.P.A., which both codified and reformed the
common law of partnerships, 9 has been adopted in forty-nine states; t0
further, its principles are reflected in varying degrees in the legal
regimes of such diverse jurisdictions as England, France, and Ger7. The staleness of partnership law is in marked contrast to the more dynamic .zforms
affecting participants in closely held corporations. Although much remains to be done, the
momentum for reform has clearly been established. For an interesting empirical study of the
attitudes of attorneys and legislators towards close corporation legislation, see Empirical
Research Project, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations-An EmpiricalStudy: Special Close
CorporationLegislation or Flexible General CorporationLaw?, 10 J. CORP. L. 849 (1985).
When partnership law is compared to the state of the pre-reform law applicable to close
corporations, there is little question that partnership law represented a relatively more
advanced and sensible regime for regulating a small business venture. Partnership law fares
less well when compared with more modern close corporation statutes and decisions reflecting
an understanding of the special problems faced by closely held business enterprises.
In one respect, however, conclusions concerning the relative advancement of the two
related areas of the law should be tempered. Partnership law, unlike corporate law, must
cover the large number of informal, casual, or even accidental relationships between coparticipants in an "intimate" business venture. The formalities needed to form a corporation,
which generally require the use of legal counsel, may result in more sophisticated planning and
the development of a degree of consensus that possibly will minimize future disputes between
the participants. The partnership form of organization, on the other hand, is a catch-all that
must embrace both well planned and carelessly established business associations. Inevitably,
partnership law, at least when applied to the latter, will of necessity appear in a more
"primitive" state than corporate law.
8. One commentator has observed:
Partnershilp-using the term in a general way-must be as old as cooperative
activity. Indeed, it has obvious origins in family and clan activity of the most
ancient and rudimentary sort. As a profit sharing arrangement it has traceable
course from Babylonian share-cropping through classical Greece and Rome to
the far-flung trading enterprises of the Renaissance.
A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 2 (1968).

9. See id. at 13 (noting that "[clourts and lawyers are fond of saying that the U.P.A.
merely codifies the common law .... In many respects, depending on a jurisdiction's version of
the common law, the Act does merely codify. But in many others, particularly those
centering on property and creditor's rights, it makes major changes").
10. Louisiana is the only state not to adopt the U.P.A. A number of adopting states,
however, have modified the U.P.A. Generally, the states have made only minor modifications.
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many.I' When legal principles have been accepted in so many jurisdictions and for such a long period of time, there is an understandable
tendency to treat them as revealed natural law.
This is simply wrong. Apart from numerous technical deficiencies in the U.P.A.,' 2 partnership law has not been tested against the
conditions under which partnerships today operate.' 3 Very little is
known about partnerships and their members. We have, for example,
little understanding of how these unincorporated ventures actually
operate. How many partnerships are formed without written agreements? What do partners assume concerning the norms that will govern their conduct? Do partners regard themselves as fiduciaries?
What types of bargaining activities occur when the parties do not
focus their attention on development of a written partnership agreement? Is bargaining an activity that takes place continuously
throughout the life of a partnership? How important are non-economic interests, such as status and self-esteem, to partners? How
egalitarian are partnerships? How and why are most partnerships
brought to an end? What are the types of disputes that occur regularly, but are not litigated? How many partners can afford to litigate
disputes? Is dissolution often an abusive act designed to squeeze out
unwanted partners?
Perhaps the very age of partnership law may render it an unattractive topic of study. Unquestionably, partnership law has a long
heritage; less politely, some might say it is antiquated. Unlike the
dynamic and well-publicized problems affecting publicly-held corporations, issues of partnership law may appear stale, and therefore,
dull. Many scholars may fail to see the attraction of a seemingly unalterable and aged body of law.
Any assumed staleness is aggravated by the facts that partnerships often are informally organized, 4 carelessly managed, less than
prosperous, and, when viewed individually, relatively inconsequential
11. See, e.g., English Partnership Act, 1890 53 & 54 Vict., ch. 39, § 24(8); E. Scamel,
(1971); H. DEVRIES, N. GALSTON, & R. LOENING,
MATERIALS FOR THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM (3rd ed. 1979); THE GERMAN COMMERCIAL
CODE (S. Goren & I. Forrester trans. 1979). See generally 13 J. HEENEY, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 1 (A. Conrad ed. 1985).
12. Those technical deficiencies will not be discussed in this article. If an example is
desired, however, one need only look at the inconsistent and confusing terminology contained
in section 38 of the U.P.A.
13. Reported litigation does little to develop or refine partnership law principles. This is
particularly true of standards affecting the fiduciary responsibilities of partners. See infra text
accompanying notes 109-64.
14. The only prerequisite to partnership status is that there be -an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT,
§ 6(1). Sometimes, partnerships are created accidentally. See Hillman, The Dissatisfied
LINDLEY ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP
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in economic effect. Stated bluntly, partnerships are messy and therefore unattractive subjects for study. They are, however, worthy of
attention, if not because of the important consequences they carry for
the multitude of individuals who choose to carry on ventures under
this most casual form of organization, 5 1then
because collectively
6
they represent a significant economic force.
The absence of an organized bar advancing the interests of members of general partnerships has undoubtedly contributed to the lifelessness of "modern" partnership law. It is interesting in this regard
to compare the profession's relative lack of interest in general partnerships with the extensive activities undertaken in support of reform of
the law applicable to limited partnerships,'" which generally are
larger and use extensively the services of lawyers. Similarly, a small
but cohesive segment of the profession has prospered in providing tax
services for partnerships, both limited and general. Most general
partners, however, are not significant consumers of legal services.
Unless and until they incorporate, attempt a public syndication, or
develop sufficient income to generate tax problems, partners constitute a large constituency without vigorous representatives in the bar.' 8
Yet another possible explanation for the sacred cow status of this
field is that as an academic discipline, partnership law is an orphan of
recognized fields of scholarship. The issues of corporate law have
appeared far more pressing and rewarding to those scholars interested
in business associations, and contract law scholars have shown little
inclination to treat partnerships as a subject of study within their discipline. Partnership law is neither fish nor fowl in the community of
legal scholars, and because it is does not fall clearly within a defined
academic discipline or popular course description, this body of law
has drifted without direction.
The orphan status of this body of law is paradoxical. It should
be apparent (but for some reason is not) that partnership law offers
tremendous opportunities for the application and refinement of newer
Participantin the Solvent Business Venture. A Consideration of the Relative Permanency of
Partnershipsand Close Corporations,67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 n.53 (1982).
15. "The demise of agency and partnership in the law school curriculum did not abolish
recurrent client problems in this important are-it merely produced a generation of inadequately
trained lawyers." D. FESSLER, supra note 3, at xix (emphasis in original).
16. As of 1982, partnerships' payrolls and receipts exceeded $30 billion and $250 billion,

respectively. See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 5, at 82. For a discussion of the
limitations of this data, see supra note 5.

17. Developed in 1916, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act was revised in 1976 and
1985. Limited partnerships are beyond the scope of this article.
18. The work of Professor Haynsworth and his Subcommittee provide a commendable
exception to the bar's characteristic neglect of partnership law. See supra note 2.
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modes of evaluating legal rules. For example, we have little understanding of the economic efficiency of partnership law. Developed
long before the application of economics-based analysis, the U.P.A.,
unlike many aspects of corporate law, has largely escaped the attention of those inclined to evaluate legal principles under standards
emphasizing the efficient allocation of resources.' 9 This is inexplicable, for partnership law would seem to be ideally suited for analysis
under efficiency criteria.2"
Partnership law should also prove of interest to scholars of contract law interested in private governance and continuing relationships. The partnership contract is different from the normal, discrete
contract between unaffiliated parties. Partnerships may have an
extended life during which conditions applicable to the conduct of the
business change dramatically. Some more modern contracts scholars
have advanced a "relational" theory of contract obligation applicable
to long-term relationships established by agreement. 2 ' These discussions, however, have typically treated partnerships in only a limited
and passing way. The isolation of partnership law from one of the
more intriguing and promising theories of contract law has unquestionably retarded its development.
The chronicle of explanations for both the neglect and the sacred
cow status of partnership law could continue indefinitely. One additional reason, however, is worthy of emphasis. "Freedom to bargain"
is an enormously popular norm advanced by scholars in diverse areas
of the law. Partnership law seems to reflect this premise, for the
U.P.A. subordinates many of its more important provisions to contrary agreements between partners. If the law of partnerships is
found in the agreements of partners, the case for "law reform" would
be tenuous. There is thus an appeal to the premise that bargaining
19. Close corporations also have been neglected in this regard. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986).
20. There is a growing body of literature on the much more general subject of agencies.
Some insights concerning partnerships may be extrapolated from this material, although for

the most part partnerships receive little or no attention. See, e.g., PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRucTURE OF BUSINESS (J.Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985); Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.PoE. ECON. 288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm.- Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
21. See, e.g., Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term
Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
VA. L. Riv. 1089 (1981); MacNeil, Values in Contracts: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L.
REv. 340 (1983); MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical. Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. Ri-v. 854 (1978)
(hereinafter MacNeil, Adjustment]; MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL.. L.
Ri.v. 691 (1974).
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should be encouraged and a corresponding conclusion that partnership law does exactly what it should do in promoting contractual relations. Upon closer examination this conclusion, however attractive its
premise, may prove unfounded.
The purpose of this article is to explore bargaining as a means of
private ordering within partnerships. Do partners bargain? When do
partners bargain? What factors, statutory or otherwise, impede bargaining? Are bargains between partners truly enforceable? How and
why are bargains broken? Does the U.P.A. provide adequate norms
to serve as bargain-substitutes? What is the relationship between bargaining and the status of partners as fiduciaries? What purposes are
served by treating partners as fiduciaries? Can either bargaining or
fiduciary responsibilities regulate the quest for private advantage
within partnerships? Resolution of these issues is problematic, and
this article will not offer a detailed "blueprint" for reform. It will,
however, evaluate limitations on bargaining, the nature of bargaining
that occurs in partnerships, widespread misperceptions about bargaining, and aspects of the U.P.A. that facilitate and retard bargaining.
As a point of reference, the analysis will frequently discuss the
classic "model" partnership for which existing partnership law seems
most suited. This is a small, intimate venture organized along egalitarian lines. The partners are active in their business, and they share
responsibilities and profits equally. Undoubtedly, this describes
many, and perhaps most, partnerships. Not all partnerships, however, fit this egalitarian norm. Some small partnerships, for example,
assume decidedly nonegalitarian characteristics as one partner
assumes dominance and other partners are relegated to a status
closely approximating that of employees. Other partnerships, such as
multi-city corporate law firms, are simply too large to operate on an
egalitarian basis. Although these more hierarchical organizations
bear little resemblance to the model egalitarian venture upon which
much of our thinking concerning partnerships is based, they are nevertheless "partnerships" structured, in theory, through bargaining.
The very diversity of partnerships renders the study of both partnership law and private ordering within partnership most challenging.
II.

AGREEMENTS, BARGAINING, AND RE-BARGAINING

The most distinctive characteristic of partnership law is the freedom it gives partners to structure their affairs by agreement. The
most common misperception of partnership law is that partnership
agreements, as popularly perceived, provide the primary means of private ordering within partnerships.
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A.

Agreements and the UP.A.

Deference to agreements is a recurring theme of the U.P.A.,
which expressly subordinates many of its more important provisions
to contrary agreements between partners. 2 With some justification,
scholars of close corporation law often look with envy on this feature
23 and recent reforms of corporate law clearly show the
of the U.P.A.,
influence of partnership law's deference to agreements.24
When compared to the alternative of rigid statutory rules for
business governance, deference to agreements provides a sensible
starting point for ordering within partnerships. Ideally, partners know
what they want and are prepared to bargain with each other for the
purpose of structuring a relationship that will yield maximum collective and individual benefits. In principle, the product of this bargaining is a partnership agreement binding each participant to the deal
that has been struck.
The reality, however, may be quite different. For a variety of
reasons, some good and others not, partners often commence their
ventures with a handshake rather than by formalizing their understandings in partnership agreements. These partnerships will thereafter operate under the "default" norms25 provided by the U.P.A. Even
when agreements are developed and bear all the trappings of binding,
unbending, and complete legal documents, partners may renegotiate
past agreements when they possess bargaining leverage to use against
their co-partners. Indeed, in many important respects, the U.P.A.
deprecates the "first" agreement and provides conditions for continuous bargaining throughout the lives of partnerships.
B.

Obstacles to the Development of Definitive Agreements

If asked to define what constitutes a "partnership agreement,"
most law students and legal professionals would describe a formal and
22. See. e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 8 (Partnership Property); § 9 (Partner Agent of
Partnership as to Partnership Business); § 18 (Rules Determining Rights and Duties of
Partners); § 27 (Assignment of Partner's Interest); § 37 (Right to Wind Up); § 38 (Rights of
Partners to Application of Partnership Property); § 40 (Rules for Distribution); § 42 (Rights
of Retiring Partner or Estate of Deceased Partner When the Business is Continued); and § 43
(Accrual of Actions).
23. See supra note 6.
24. See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Laws, Proposed Statutory Close Corporation
Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act, 37 Bus. LAw. 269 (1981). The American
Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws adopted the proposals in 1982. Committee
on Corporate Laws. Stanutor, Close CorporationSupplement to the Model Business Corporation
Act. 38 Bus. LAw. 1031 (1983).
25. See supro note 22. The norms are termed "'default" because they are effective only
when partners have not reached contrary agreements.
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usually lengthy document negotiated and executed at the inception of
a partnership. Under this inaugural view of partnership agreements,
the governance of partnerships occurs with reference to the product of
the consensus manifested but once.
Accepting only for the moment this view of partnership agreements, a number of factors may limit the ability of partners to establish an agreement adequate to regulate their relationship in the future.
Some of these limitations arise from conditions external to the agreement, including both the unwillingness of many partners to articulate
and formalize their understandings and various provisions of the
U.P.A. undermining the effects of prior bargains. Other limitations
are inherent in the agreements themselves.
1.

INFORMALITY

Partnership agreements in the form of written, definitive statements of the relative rights and duties of partners are unknown to
many partners. A large number of partnerships, perhaps a majority,
are created informally.2 6 Lawyers are not consulted. Written documents are not prepared. Establishment of the relationship is a nonevent.
The ease of forming a partnership may undermine effective bargaining. Because of the unwillingness or inability of partners to avail
themselves of bargaining opportunities, the occasion for the development of consensus through an agreement often is not present.
Accordingly, the great freedom accorded partners to alter statutory
norms by agreement may be of little benefit to a large number of partners whose ventures are best described, at least initially, as partnerships without bargains. E
2.

MISGUIDED OPTIMISM

Acting in concert with informality to inhibit bargaining and the
development of an agreement is the "bliss" so often characteristic of
participants about to wed in a closely held venture. At the inception
of a business relationship, the possibility of anything other than prosperity and happiness may seem remote to those pooling their
resources in a commercial marriage. 28 Because of this, the very act of
26. Unlike a corporation, a partnership may be formed without adherence to any
formalities. See supra note 14.
27. Oral agreements, however, are common; for obvious reasons, such understandings
cover a relatively limited number of issues. If proven, they are generally enforceable. For a
discussion of the applicability of the statute of frauds, see A. BROMBI'R(;, Supra note 8,§ 23.
28. "Since a partnership is an extremely intimate relationship, perhaps the greatest
potential problem is the risk of future disagreement among those who start out with the
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bargaining over matters that may suggest a divergence of interests
may appear antithetical to the harmony and trust existing in the early
stages of a jointly-owned business.2 9 It is only in retrospect that the
eventual disintegration of a partnership was foreseeable.
3.

LONG TERM AGREEMENTS AND THE FUTURE

Assuming partners engage in serious bargaining, a further problem relevant to both partnerships and close corporations is that there
is only so much that an agreement can accomplish. An agreement
may establish, for example, the relative interests and duties of the
participants, the term of the venture, and the consequences of a dissolution. These issues are not difficult to isolate and can be anticipated
and addressed through bargaining. But business governance is far
more dynamic than a limited list of bargaining issues would suggest.3"
Individuals establishing a venture make certain assumptions concerning the subsequent course of their business and the relationships likely
to be developed between the participants. In so doing, they view the
future largely from the perspective of the present. Although the better partnership agreements attempt to anticipate change, the degree to
which any agreement reflecting a bargain at a defined point in time
can do this is open to question.
4.

LEGAL ACTORS AS INHIBITORS OF BARGAINING

Assuming legal counsel is retained, a number of factors limit the
effectiveness of an attorney in facilitating bargaining between partners. One is the understandable tendency of partners in smaller ventures to employ only one attorney to document their understandings.
This reflects both a desire to control costs and a general aversion
towards the legal profession. Although accepted standards of professional conduct may tolerate such arrangements,3" and use of a single
highest mutual regard." Worcester, The Drafting of Partnership Agreements, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 985, 986 (1950).
29. See Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close CorporateDisputes, 56
VA. L. REV. 271, 276 (1970) ("Planning for irreconcilable disagreement may itself strain the
mutual trust upon which the business collaboration is founded."). For an account of a lawyer
advising business partners against having a formal agreement, see Hetherington, Special
Characteristics,Problems,and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 17 n.65; see
also

W.

KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE

61-63

(1986).

30. See Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships,37 U. FLA. L. REV. 691 (1985).
31. Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, requires client
consent if "representation of [a] client will be directly adverse to another client". The
comment, however, reflects a rather accommodating approach: "A lawyer may not represent
multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other,
but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest
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lawyer may reduce the friction that is so often the by-product of bargaining between lawyers, the interests of partners will in a number of
respects diverge rather than converge. The combined role of mediator
and bargain-facilitator is one for which many lawyers are not well
suited.2
A related problem concerns the function lawyers are to perform
in assisting individuals about to launch a partnership. More precisely,
are lawyers expected to be participants in the process of molding the
relationships of their clients, or are they assigned the more limited
role of documenting the bargaining efforts of others? And, more
importantly, who makes the determination of the role to be performed
by lawyers? To a large extent, the answers depend on the size of the
venture, the sophistication of the clients, the experience of the lawyers, and the involvement of other professionals, such as investment
bankers and accountants. 3
Our immediate concern is general partnerships. Typically, these
ventures are not of a size to justify employment of more than one
lawyer; use of individuals from other professions is out of the question. 4 In some cases, the partners are more sophisticated than their
attorneys, a condition that normally limits the "legal" function to one
of documentation. In other cases, however, the partners may rely
upon their lawyer to advise them on matters not traditionally
regarded as legal in nature. And for those lawyers with general practices and limited experience in business problems, this may prove
difficult.
How do lawyers gain sophistication in business matters? Many
do, although law schools can certainly claim no credit for the achievement. 35 Normally, sophistication is the product of post-law school
specialization and experience. The benefit of the resulting sophistication is available only to those willing to pay the premium charged for
specialized legal services. However cost-effective this purchase may
be, many partners about to embark on their comparatively smallscaled ventures will turn to seemingly less expensive and less expereven though there is some difference of interest among them." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
32. Lawyers are aware that their involvement in the planning process may itself be a cause
of friction between partners. See W. KILEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 29, at 63-65.
33. For an excellent discussion of these and related questions, see Gilson, Value Creation
by Business Lawyers. Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). For the most
part, the clients of the lawyers Professor Gilson studied are larger entities better able to afford
costly legal services than the "typical" partner discussed in this portion of the article.
34. This is,however, with the possible exception of accountants.
35. I am in complete agreement with the observations of Professor Gilson in this regard.
See Gilson, supra note 33, at 303-06.

19871

PRIVATE ORDERING WITHIN PARTNERSHIPS

ienced general practitioners for needed legal services.36 This decision
is reinforced by the attitudes of larger law firms, which for reasons of
economics and prestige see little advantage in including small partner-

ships in their client bases.
Further, the documentation function traditionally performed by
the lawyer may retard rather than promote bargaining. Again, con-

siderations of expense, efficient use of a lawyer's time, and breadth of
business background may preclude the attorney from tailoring the
agreement to the needs of the parties.3 7 Form books, scissors, and
paste lower costs, but at the expense of negating actual bargaining

between partners.38 For this reason, a tailored and comprehensive
agreement may prove an elusive goal for most partnerships.39
Whether that goal is even worthy of pursuit, however, depends in part
upon the adequacy of traditional drafting approaches in responding to
the needs of many partners.
Agreements drafted by lawyers tend to be quite specific. Many
disputes between partners, however, do not fall within the precise
terms of even "definitive" agreements. A very large amount of litigation between partners is resolved on a basis other than prior agreements between the partners. Claims based on breaches of fiduciary
duties, for example, do not normally rest upon violations of written
agreements, but rather are grounded more generally in broad assertions that certain actions

violate the standard of "good faith"

partners.4"

No matter how complete the agreement, it
expected of
will leave open a vast range of matters that may be the subject of
future disputes.
36. Admittedly, the observations offered in this paragraph are very generalized, and
exceptions should be noted. In particular, a number of attorneys practicing alone or in small
firms have developed specialized practices, are very sophisticated in business matters, and
provide cost-effective legal services for their clients. This is in contrast to the larger number of
attorneys with more general practices and comparatively little business law experience.
37. See supra note 15.
38. Commentators have recently suggested that lawyers may exercise greater care in
preparing partnership agreements than corporate documents, which may be perceived as
routine. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 29, at 65-66. They acknowledge, however,
that this observation is based upon "casual empiricism." Given the inadequate training most
lawyers have received in partnership law, it is unclear how, on a cost-effective basis, they can
produce adequate partnership agreements. On the basis of my own "casual empiricism," I
disagree with Professors Klein and Coffee and believe that standard forms dominate "creative"
thought in the drafting of partnership agreements, particularly when considerations of cost are
important.
39. Cf. Fessler, The Fate of Closely Held Business Associations: The Debatable Wisdom of
"Incorporation",13 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 473, 483-84 n.22 (1980) ("Perhaps it is appropriate
that the lack of considered reasoning that is often behind the decision to incorporate can now
be matched by an absence of particularized drafting in the crucial process of incorporation.").
40. See infra text accompanying notes 119-64.
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A definitive agreement may not only prove incomplete, but also
may be poorly understood by the partners for whom it has been prepared. The term "legalisms," although pejorative, may aptly describe
the work product of many attorneys called upon to prepare partnership agreements. Whether partners actually read these documents is
open to question. Whether they understand them is even more problematic. We can dismiss this as the failings of the partners themselves, although the large number of partners who gain their first real
understanding of their agreements only upon litigation may have
strong contrary opinions on the matter.
This raises the issue of whether radically different approaches
should be developed for the drafting of some partnership agreements.4 1 Typically, a lawyer asked to draft a contract of any variety
will produce a lengthy and complex document purporting to state the
mutual rights and obligations of the parties. The attorney who adopts
a nonconventional approach proceeds at her peril. However comforting to lawyers, these documents may appear to partners to be irrelevant to the deals they have struck. This may in part explain the
aversion displayed by many partners to the use of attorneys.
Courageous and innovative attorneys might consider a different
approach to the drafting of partnership agreements for those who
might otherwise avoid the use of legal counsel.4 2 Consider, for example, the potential bargaining stimulus prompted by a one page partnership agreement. This brief document, unknown to most American
lawyers, might begin with a brief statement of the expectations of each
participant and follow with an equally concise list of the principal
terms under which they will operate.43 The development of such an
agreement may facilitate bargaining far more effectively than delegation of the drafting function to a disinterested third party. The attorney would then assume the role of educator, a task for which he, at
least theoretically,4 4 is well suited.4 5
41. The traditional approach may remain most suitable for those partnerships with
substantial resources and populated by sophisticated partners. In these types of ventures, the
substantial costs in bargaining may be justified.
42. In particular, the alternative approaches work best for small partnerships.
43. With proper coaching, some partners could write their own agreements.
44. Once again, the problem becomes one of adequately educating attorneys and law
students.
45. More cautious but still innovative attorneys may bifurcate the contract. One
document would be the typical, lengthy partnership agreement. The second document would
be a concise Statement of Mutual Expectations. In many cases, this latter document would
serve to focus the partners' attention on the major "deal points" and the reasons for the
commitment of each participant. The Statement of Mutual Expectations is related to but
distinguishable from the more traditional letter of intent. Unlike the typical letter of intent,
the Statement would constitute a "'binding" document that may significantly affect the
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If the use in some situations of a partnership agreement as a simple, constitutional document46 has merit, then yet another alternative
should be considered. California has developed statutory will forms
largely in response to the reluctance of many individuals to use traditional legal services.4 7 Partners without agreement are, in a sense,
intestate, and the development of a simple, statutory partnership
agreement may be an appropriate response to the unwillingness or
inability of many partners to pay for more customized legal services.4 8

Such a form could consist of a checklist easily reviewed by partners
and completed with the assistance of an attorney. Costs would be
reduced, and the options presented on the statutory form would focus
the attention of partners on the principal issues affecting their relationships. Obviously, some partners would require customized part-

nership agreements prepared along more traditional lines, but a
simple statutory form would facilitate bargaining and agreements by

many partners who otherwise would establish their relationships
more casually.
If we wish partners to bargain then it is necessary for the legal
profession to develop mechanisms and services to facilitate that process.49 In evaluating the reasons many partners decline bargaining
opportunities, aversion to the form and costs of traditional legal services should not be overlooked.
5.

DISSOLUTION AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING PRIOR BARGAINS

One of the most curious features of the U.P.A. is that it renders
Strangely, the reverence
all partnerships freely dissolvable.5
accorded agreements by partnership law does not extend to agreeresolution of future disputes. For example, the Statement may provide a basis for a judicial
decree of dissolution under the "equitable" circumstances standard of section 32 of the U.P.A.
46. Cf. MacNeil, Adjustment, supra note 21, at 894 ("I feel some temptation to think of
the written parts of contractual relations, especially very formal parts, such as collective
[But] [i]f that
bargaining agreements and corporate charters and bylaws, as constitutions ....
concept or terminology is used to resurrect 'constitutions' long decayed and made obsolete,...
we are, as a matter of principle, back to a relationally dysfunctional neoclassicism.").
47. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6240 (West 1986).
48. Cf Note, The Statutory Will: A Simple Alternative to Intestacy, 35 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 307 (1984) (noting that the cost and complexity of estate planning are obstacles for many
testators and that the statutory will is an appropriate response to these problems).
49. Although this discussion focuses upon drafting, there are additional issues concerning
the contributions of lawyers in business transactions and the adequacy of legal education in
preparing students to become business lawyers. See generally Gilson, supra note 33.
50. Dissolution may be caused by the "express will" of any partner. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 31(l)(b), (2). Other causes of dissolution include the termination of the partnership
term, the express will of all partners, the expulsion of a partner, an event making it unlawful to
continue the business, the death of a partner, the bankruptcy of a partner or the partnership,
and a judicial decree. Id. § 31.
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ments to maintain (or more precisely, not to dissolve) a partnership
for a defined term. Although this point is sometimes misunderstood
by scholars,5" the
"indissoluble partnership" does not exist under
52
law.
partnership
The free dissolvability of partnerships limits the incentive to bargain, for although an agreement may render a premature wrongful
dissolution 3 costly in some cases,5 4 the power of a partner to escape
an unhappy relationship cannot be abrogated by prior agreement.
Thus, partnership law both encourages partners to bargain and provides these same individuals with an expeditious method of avoiding
in many circumstances the adverse consequences of their bargaining.
This inflexibility reflected in the U.P.A.'s principle of free dissolvability is uncharacteristic of the Act's general tendency to defer to
agreements altering its provisions. Free dissolvability, which is based
upon arcane and misunderstood principles of agency law, 5 is an
undesirable feature of partnership law and a principle much in need of
reform. Pending that reform, free dissolvability operates as a disincentive to bargaining early in a partnership. If any partner is free to
dissolve the partnership unilaterally and without regard to cause, then
the benefits to be derived from serious bargaining and the development of a partnership agreement are lessened. With benefits diminishing and costs remaining stable, it is not surprising that many partners
do not avail themselves of the bargaining opportunities provided by
the U.P.A.
51. See, e.g.. Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 1130 n.94 (indicating a partnership cannot

be dissolved at the pleasure of one partner prior to expiration unless cause exists, but relying
on a pre-U.P.A. case not reflective of present law).
52. For a more extensive discussion of the free dissolvability principle, see Hillman, supra
note 30, at 691.
53. This is a dissolution in breach of an agreement establishing a term or undertaking for
the partnership. See generally Hillman, Misconduct as a Basisfor Excluding or Expelling a
Partner. Effecting Commercial Divorce and Securing Custody of the Business, 78 Nw. U.L.
REV. 527, 537-39 (1983).
54. A wrongful dissolution may result in the imposition of sanctions under section 38 of

the U.P.A. against the dissolving partner. These include (1) avoidance of the otherwise
applicable liquidation right if the other partners elect to continue the business for the agreed
term and indemnify the dissolving partner against certain liabilities; (2) a deferral of the
dissolving partner's account settlement if the business is continued and a bond is posted to
secure the interest; and (3) adjustment of the dissolving partner's account to disregard
goodwill of the partnership and reflect damages resulting from the premature dissolution.
These sanctions will prove ineffective in many cases. Damages are rarely awarded, and
continuation of the business without the dissolving partner may prove problematic, See

Hillman, supra note 30, at 715-16; infra text accompanying notes 154-64.
55. See Hillman, supra note 30, at 701-07.
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6.

HIERARCHICAL PARTNERSHIPS

The above discussion has largely assumed that partnerships are
egalitarian enterprises.5 6 The key characteristic of such ventures is
the relative equality between prospective and actual partners, a state
conducive, at least in theory, to arms length bargaining. Admittedly,
the U.P.A. contemplates more structured, or hierarchical, ventures,
but it seems to contemplate bargaining as the triggering process for
movement away from egalitarian norms."
Not all partnerships, however, fit this model. Some partnerships
take on decidedly nonegalitarian characteristics over time as one or
more participants assume positions of dominance.58 Other partnerships are established as structured, hierarchical business organizations
that continually admit new partners; any bargaining that resulted in
the nonegalitarian structuring preceded the admission of the newer
partners. In either case, the position of subordinate partners may
more closely approximate that of employees than co-owners. Traditional assumptions concerning bargaining do not apply to these
ventures.
One of the better examples of hierarchical partnerships is found
in large partnerships of professionals such as corporate law firms.
These partnerships provide good, but largely unstudied, illustrations
of ventures with strong, nonegalitarian features.5 9 Consider the plight
of the large law firm's associate who labors five, seven, nine, or more
years in the quest to become a partner. During this period, she knows
little about the partnership or the income of partners. She is quite
sure, however, that "partner" is a status worthy of pursuit. When the
day of her reward arrives and she is invited to be a partner, the associate is presented with a copy of the partnership agreement, which obviously will provide a structure for the partnership quite different from
that offered by the U.P.A.'s default provisions. This event is perfunctory; bargaining opportunities are nonexistent; the definitive agreement is an imposed agreement." Although the associate may have
56. See supra text following note 21.
57. Most particularly, partners may waive their equal participatory rights and delegate
management authority to one or more partners. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18.
58. See, e.g., Ferrick v. Barry, 320 Mass. 217, 68 N.E.2d 690 (1946) (domination led to
dissolution).
59. "When one thinks about it for a moment, it seems astonishing that law firms should
have for so long remained almost unexplored in legal scholarship. These are, after all, social
institutions of some prominence." Gordon, Introduction to Symposium on the Corporate Law
Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1985). The Stanford Law Review's symposium offers one of the
more complete and diverse treatments of large law firms, although the role of partnership law
in regulating the relationships of members of these firms is largely ignored.
60. It is therefore treated under the discussion of obstacles to the development of definitive
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reservations concerning the agreement, she has only two choices: (1)
she can sign it anyway; or (2) she can find another job. Inevitably, she
will sign.
This newly admitted partner, of course, is still in reality an
employee. 6 Her admission to partnership has given her a greater
measure of security, status, and income, but it represents only a step
in her movement within the highly structured firm. Bargaining among
partners in the firm may indeed occur, but it is typically a postadmission phenomenon reflective of existing partners' attempts to
reallocate income based upon perceptions of their values to the firm. 62
The idea of bargaining at the stage of promotion of an associate to
membership in the partnership is fanciful. The bargaining model of
partnership formation, like most principles of the U.P.A., is simply
irrelevant to this type of venture.6 3
7.

SUMMARY

Partnership law is not, as many believe, simply the "law of the
agreement." The first step in evaluating the effectiveness of bargaining at the inception of a partnership is to recognize the limitations
inherent in even serious attempts to develop an adequate partnership
agreement. The second step, discussed below, is to consider the ongoing nature of the bargaining that occurs in a partnership.
C.

Re-Bargaining

Under the traditional view of partnerships, bargaining is what
partners are supposed to do at the beginning of their relationships.
Somewhat naively, partners who successfully complete this process
may believe that its product, the partnership agreement, will govern
their future relationships. If partnership agreements represented discrete contracts performed over a short or even intermediate period of
agreements. In this case, there is a definitive agreement but the newly-admitted partner played
no role in shaping its terms.
61. This may change, however, as she achieves status and assumes power within the
partnership. See infra text accompanying notes 154-64.
62. It therefore more closely approximates re-bargaining. See infra text accompanying
notes 65-76. See generally Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among Human Capitalists. An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L.
RpV. 313 (1965).
63. The admission of the new partner does not cause the dissolution of the old partnership.
See Bromberg, Dissolution-Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEx. L. REv. 631, 636-37
(1965). To existing partners, the admission is not an event requiring bargaining. To the new
partner, on the other hand, it is the moment that most closely approximates the occasion for
bargaining under the traditional U.P.A. approach to the development of partnership
agreements, At this point, the opportunity is more theoretical than real.
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time, there would be little cause for concern. Because the agreements
normally attempt to provide the basis for regulating long-term relationships, however, they may prove over time incapable of adapting to
the changing conditions affecting partnerships.64 This gives rise to rebargaining.
1.

RE-BARGAINING EXISTING AGREEMENTS

Whether bargaining subsequent to the adoption of an agreement
should be encouraged or discouraged depends upon the role assigned
the initial partnership agreement.65 If the first agreement is to provide
the basis for business governance, and if partners are to be encouraged
to devote their maximum efforts to bargaining at the early stages of a
venture, re-bargaining should be discouraged. If, on the other hand,
partnerships are viewed as fluid or evolving in character, the initial
agreement should merely set the stage for subsequent adjustments of
the relative rights and duties of partners. This latter view, which
encourages re-bargaining, promotes flexibility at the expense of discouraging concerted bargaining efforts early in the life of a venture.
The adoption of either view will have profound effects on the attitudes
of partners in bargaining and their willingness to incur transaction
costs in the stages of their partnerships.
The U.P.A. does not take a clear position on re-bargaining. Its
deference to agreements is inconclusive, for the Act fails to address
when those agreements may develop. Indeed, some of the most
important features of the U.P.A. are the provisions rendering all partnerships freely dissolvable. These provisions almost certainly have
the effect of encouraging post-agreement bargaining.66 Like other
"rational" individuals in constant pursuit of wealth maximization,67
many partners will seek every opportunity to improve their positions
at the expense of other participants in their ventures.68 Since each
partner has the unilateral power to end the relationship at any time
64. Recent writings on regional contracts, and in particular the work of Ian MacNeil, have
influenced much of this analysis. See supra note 21. Professor MacNeil, however, presumably
would disagree with many of conclusions.
65. The analysis of re-bargaining assumes partnerships either have or do not have
agreements. Obviously, partnership agreements may cover only some issues, while not
addressing others. The analysis can be adapted to this point by simply evaluating whether the
matter under dispute in a partnership has been addressed in a prior agreement.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
67. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 3 (1977).
68. Those who have observed a diverse group of partners may note that many do not seek
advantages to the detriment of their co-participants. Perhaps this can be explained with
reference to the value of a good reputation. A more plausible reason is that many individuals
feel a moral obligation to adhere to their bargains.
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and without regard to prior contrary agreements, the stage is set for
re-bargaining if a partner's continued participation is perceived by
other partners as more desirable than his withdrawal.
All of this suggests a certain mythical quality to the common,
generalized view of the partnership agreement as the primary basis for
business governance. The partnership agreement may represent only
a first step in a long process of bargaining.6 9 To the degree that stability of membership is perceived as important, there will be a constant
movement within a partnership toward maintenance of a consensus.
Although this may seem a desirable state for the law to encourage, it
can work a considerable hardship on those who are asked to pay the
price for the maintenance of the consensus. Stronger partners will ask
for concessions from their weaker counterparts. If the "price" of the
concessions is less than the "price" accompanying a premature dissolution, then the weaker party will grant them.7"
Plausible arguments can be advanced in support of the U.P.A.'s
encouragement of the re-bargaining of existing agreements. 7' Efficiency considerations, for example, may provide support for the process of continuous bargaining in, and easy dissolution of,
partnerships.72 In balance, however, the U.P.A. seems to have gone
too far. Individuals about to form a partnership should be permitted
to assess the costs and benefits of developing a partnership agreement.
They will know, of course, that the agreement can be little more than
a constitutional document, but they need not be dissuaded from this
effort by a principle that makes it impossible to preclude an abrogation of the contract through a dissolution of their partnership.7 3
Although partners cannot preclude re-bargaining, they should be
allowed to limit the activity more sharply than present law would
69. In some cases, however, it limits significantly re-bargaining opportunities. See infra
note 76.
70. See supra note 54. The agreement may attempt to render a dissolution costly by
making it wrongful. This is accomplished through the establishment of a partnership term. It
can also increase costs by controlling the consequences of a dissolution through continuation
agreements (giving nondissolving partners the right to continue the business) and by including
covenants not to compete enforceable against a dissolving partner. In some cases, these may
render dissolution prohibitively expensive for the dissolving partner. In cases in which the
services of the dissolving partner are critical to the venture and continuation of the business
without this individual is problematic, these contractual provisions prove less effective. See
also infra text accompanying notes 154-64.
71. Cf Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 6 (arguing for freer dissolvability of close
corporations).
72. See Hillman, supra note 30, at 7.13-20.
73. For a discussion of problems of specific enforcement of partnership agreements, see
Hillman, supra note 30.
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permit.7 4
2.

"RE-BARGAINING" NON-AGREEMENTS

Re-bargaining in the absence of a definitive agreement may be
viewed in a different light. 75 Although partners in rare cases may simply bargain to operate under the default provisions of the U.P.A., the
application of those statutory principles more probably reflects the
absence of bargaining at the inception of a relationship. Re-bargaining in such cases represents a process that has merely been deferred.
If a consensus cannot be reached, the partnership will operate under
the statutory default norms. But it may not operate this way for long.
Free dissolvability permits a partner dissatisfied with these norms to
end the relationship. The threat of dissolution may be sufficient to
prompt serious bargaining at this stage in the life of a partnership. In
short, the failure to bargain at the inception of a venture does not
preclude, and in fact may prompt, continual bargaining during the life
of a partnership. 6
74. There are limits, however, on the degree to which partners should be held to bad
bargains. The interests to be protected are those of both satisfied and disgruntled partners
within a venture. When it is clear that expectations fundamental to participation of the
dissatisfied partner have been frustrated, and when damage to other partners from a
termination of the partnership are minimal, dissolution may provide a sufficient safety valve to
protect the interests of a partner from adverse consequences resulting from the bargain he once
negotiated.
Although dissolution as a means of escaping a bad bargain should be available, its use
should be far more restricted than is presently the case. If partners have not bargained for a
term, dissolution by express will should remain an option available to any participant. If,
however, the previous bargain includes mutual commitments respecting the duration of the
venture, each partner has effectively waived the right to accomplish a unilateral dissolution
through an expression of will. Under these circumstances, dissolution by decree upon showing
of cause should be the exclusive method by which a single partner could prematurely cause a
dissolution of the venture. This would limit to a considerable degree the "threat" of
dissolution as a means of forcing re-bargaining. I offered a similar proposal in connection with
dissolution of close corporations. See Hillman, supra note 14, at 69-87.
75. Although "re-bargaining" nonagreements is a misnomer, the term is used for
consistency purposes.
76. Re-bargaining partial agreements is also noteworthy. Partners sometimes reach only
very limited agreements at the inception of their ventures. For example, their agreement may
be limited to an understanding that one partner will be entitled to disproportionate allocations
of future profits. Under most circumstances, very narrow agreements of this sort do not limit
the range of future bargaining, and free dissolvability may render such an understanding shortlived.
Limited agreements establishing the duration of a partnership are more problematic.
Suppose, for example, partners agree only that their venture will have a term of ten years. The
default norms will apply, subject to modifications that may result from future bargaining. The
establishment of a term, however, may render subsequent bargaining more difficult to the
degree dissolution is rendered costly to the partner who brings the relationship to an end
prematurely. See supra note 54.
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SUMMARY

Continual re-bargaining may be a sensible method for ordering
within a partnership. Partners should, however, have the opportunity
to reduce the uncertainty, costs, and instability associated with this
process by developing agreements designed to minimize re-bargaining. If partners choose not to bargain at the inception of their relationships, they may merely defer bargaining to a point when it may
prove problematic.
D. Implied Agreements

Even when there can be no reasonable finding of an express
agreement, oral or written, numerous courts have found implied
agreements altering statutory norms on such fundamental issues as
payment of a salary 77 and duration of the venture. These findings
have contributed significantly to the ad hoc and static nature of the
case law on partnerships.
Implied agreements represent contradictory undercurrents in
partnership law. At first glance, inferring agreements may appear
consistent with the exalted role partnership law assigns the agreement. Yet the very bargaining underlying most agreements is often
not present for those understandings that must be inferred. Indeed,
inferring agreements may negate bargains, for the failure of partners
to establish an express agreement on a particular issue will in some
cases represent their understanding that the default norms of the
U.P.A., applicable in the absence of agreements to the contrary, will
be applied.78
It is important to put into perspective the context in which the
existence of implied agreements is tested. Almost invariably, disputes
over implied contracts are resolved during the dissolution or winding
up 79 phases of partnerships. Implied contracts may thus present a
theoretical basis for accomplishing a fair allocation of assets at the
close of a partnership's life.8" "Fair" for this purpose means a result
contrary to that which would occur through application of statutory
norms.8" In such cases, the implied contract doctrine provides a con77. See Busick v. Stoetzl, 264 Cal. App. 2d 736, 70 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1968).
78. Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 285 ("[T]he failure of [shareholders] to
include a particular contracting term is ambiguous. It may mean that the parties did not want
the term, but it could mean that they were ignorant.").
79. Winding up is the period between dissolution and termination, during which time the
business of the partnership is brought to an end. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Ac'r § 30.
80. Litigation between partners prior to dissolution is limited. See infta text
accompanying notes 151-52.
81. The quest for fairness through avoidance of statutory norms is most clearly illustrated
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venient means to achieve an equitable result even when the existence
of implied agreements is, at best, tenuous. This approach is illustrated
by the unrestrained enthusiasm of one court in advancing the case for
implied contracts: "The courts have not hesitated to find an implied
agreement [modifying statutory norms] when fair play impels such a
result." 82
The problem comes in developing a framework for treating
implied partnership agreements. If the just resolution of disputes
between partners is an aim of partnership law, the implication of contracts may prove an effective, albeit frequently disingenuous, means of
achieving this result. If, on the other hand, principles reasonably certain in application and likely to produce the most correct results in
the largest number of cases are to be developed, and if incentives are
to be provided for partners to express clearly their agreements, inferring contracts as a means of avoiding norms should be discouraged.
The latter approach is more sensible and likely to benefit a greater
number of partners over the long run.
Inferring agreements as a norm-defeating device should be discouraged. If the norms produce unjust results in a large number of
cases, they should be revised; if the norms produce inequities in a
small number of cases, they should be rendered more flexible by defining the circumstances under which courts may exercise discretion.
Implied agreements should be treated as exceptional and recognized
only under narrow circumstances and after the party asserting the
agreement has established clearly the existence of conduct tantamount to consent.8 3 This approach would both focus attention on the
by the large number of cases legitimizing the inference of agreements to pay salaries. Absent
an agreement to the contrary, the U.P.A. precludes salary payments to partners. UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18 (f). If one partner, for example, proves to be a laggard while another
performs disproportionate services, one way to avoid unjust enrichment of the former and
unjust detriment to the latter is to infer from the circumstances consent to the payment of a
salary to the active partner. The result-avoidance of the U.P.A. default norm-may prove
equitable, although the reasoning, which rests on fictional agreements, is strained. A few cases
can be read to reject, or at least resist, the efficacy of implying contracts for the payment of a
salary. See, e.g., Barthuly v. Barthuly, 192 Neb. 610, 223 N.W.2d 429 (1974); Levy v. Leavitt,
257 N.Y. 461, 178 N.E. 758 (1931); Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970).
Implied agreements concerning partnership terms have also been found. See supra note 78.
When partners enter long-term third-party commitments such as leases and financings. for
example, they may expect their ventures to continue for a term at least coincident with those
transactions. See, e.g., Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P.2d 375 (1938). The inferences of the
implied term cases, although sometimes strained, seem more sensible than those reflected ill
many of the decisions inferring agreements to pay salaries.
82. Busick v. Stoetzl, 264 Cal. App. 2d at 738, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (1968).
83. See Bemiss v. Widows' & Orphans' Home of Christian Church of Ky.. 191 Ky. 316,
320, 230 S.W. 310. 312 (1921) ("[I]t
is not imperatively essential that the agreement for
compensation should be a express one, since it may be allowed under an implied one, but the
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efficacy of the statutory default norms and encourage partners to
express more clearly their agreements.
III.

STATUTORY DEFAULT NORMS AS BARGAIN-SUBSTITUTES

Three features of partnerships and the U.P.A. may tend to subvert the agreement as the primary device of business governance.
First, both the ability and the tendency of partners to develop truly
comprehensive written agreements are limited. Second, the U.P.A.
acts to undermine bargaining at the inception of a relationship by
encouraging adjustments subsequent to the development of complete
partnership agreements. Finally, the tendency of courts to infer
agreements minimizes the role of early bargaining and may reflect
implicit dissatisfaction with application of the U.P.A. default norms
to partnership governance.8 4 The existence of these forces tending to
subvert agreements among partners necessitates careful consideration
of the role and efficacy of the statutory default norms.
A.

Statutory Norms as "Gap Fillers"

The default provisions of the U.P.A. serve to fill the gaps not
covered by agreements.85 In essence, the various norms established
by the Act, applicable in the absence of agreements to the contrary,
represent the supposed understandings partners most likely reach if
they choose to bargain on the various issues. To the degree that these
norms accurately reflect hypothetical agreements, they effect significant cost savings to partners by freeing them of the necessity to contract extensively. 6
There are some problems, however, with this view of the U.P.A.
First, it may assume that partners are aware of the default provisions
of the Act and knowingly adopt them in place of more individually
tailored agreements. Such an assumption concerning knowledge of
statutory standards may, if tested, prove unfounded. Alternatively,
the view of the U.P.A's default provisions as cost-effective bargain
substitutes would have merit if the statutory norms represent the
types of agreements that most partners would reach if they chose to
bargain specifically on the issues. Whatever the validity of such a
conclusion when the norms were developed, the need for a reexamination of the default provisions as bargain substitutes is clear.
facts necessary to raise such an implication should he established by clear and convincing
evidence.").
84. This latter factor is probably less common and therefore less important.
85. See supra note 22.
86. See. e.g., M. Eist1Nt11-RG, Tiii- St'Ruc'uRt ot1 THE CoRPORATION 9-12 (1976).
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The Adequacy of Statutory Norms as Bargain-Substitutes

A number of the U.P.A.'s default provisions may seem counterintuitive to many partners. The usefulness of the statutory norms as
bargain-substitutes is undermined to the degree that partners are unaware of their existence and they would not have accepted the provisions if presented with alternatives. The very age of the U.P.A. norms
is sufficient to create questions concerning their validity, particularly
when one recalls that the norms have enjoyed an unusually privileged
life, free of the pressure imposed by critical inquiry.
The following discussion will focus on default norms that address
the decision-making process within partnerships, although other
norms not discussed are equally deserving of attention. For example,
the prohibition on salary payments to partners and the failure of the
U.P.A. to require the performance of duties by a partner are examples

of additional norms that might fall as a result of careful review.87
87. Nowhere is an egalitarian view of partnerships more evident than in the U.P.A.'s
prohibition on salary payments to partners. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18 (f); see supra note
81. When combined with the "equal participatory rights" accorded partners, the U.P.A.
reflects a view of partnerships as ventures in which partners divide the fruits of their collective
efforts. See generally Hillman, Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look at Participatory
Rights in the Management of General Partnerships,1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 865.
While this egalitarian premise may be accepted by many partners at the beginning of their
ventures, over time the contributions of participants may become decidedly unequal. In some
cases, this results from the extraordinary efforts of one or more partners. In other cases,
however, movement away from the egalitarian model is attributable to the lack of-efforts by
certain partners. Given the principles of equal division of profits, equal participatory rights,
and no disproportionate payments in the form of a salary, the Act might well include a
mandate that partners have equal participatory duties to match their equal participatory
rights. Although the U.P.A. does not expressly establish a duty to participate, a few cases
have suggested such a duty. See, e.g., Condon v. Moran, 11 N.J. Super. 221, 224, 78 A.2d 295,
297 (1951); cf Koenig v. Huber, 87 S.D. 507, 509, 210 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1973) (suggesting,
rather vaguely, the possibility of a duty to render services but finding the duty had not been
breached); see also U.P.A. REVISION SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 71-72.
Inequality of service contributions contrary to original expectations may lead to the
implication of an agreement to pay a salary as a means of defeating application of the statutory
norm or provide grounds for dissolving a partnership. See supra note 81.
It is ironic that the U.P.A. is protective of the right of each partner to perform services
but is vague on the duty of partners to participate in their ventures. Inevitably, problems arise.
but remedies, short of dissolution or the inference of agreements, are virtually nonexistent.
For partnerships that are terminable at will, dissolution may prove an adequate remedy. But if
a partnership has been established for a term, dissolution may prove undesirable to the
partners desiring to continue the venture without the potential destructive effects of a
dissolution.
This suggests that the addition of two new default norms may merit further consideration.
First, the award of cqual participatory rights could be balanced with a mandate of equal
participatory duties. Further. a means of providing substance to the newly established duly
would he to provide a mechanism for the reallocation of income through salary payments in
the event that one or more partners failto contribute services in line with ithe original
understanding upon which the parties formed the partnership.
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UNANIMITY AND MAJORITY VOTE STANDARDS

Although rule by majority is a well-established norm for the
management of business enterprises, the majority occupies a precarious position in the management of partnerships. Only those disputes
that "arise as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership"8 8
are resolved by majority vote; 9 any act in contravention of the partnership agreement requires the consent of all partners.9" Unanimity is
a principle of such strength that one court has suggested that agreements permitting amendment by majority vote may be unenforceable
when the approved change affects fundamental aspects of the relationship between partners. 9
One obvious problem with the statutory guidelines is the division
of partnership decisions into only two classifications: (1) matters that
are ordinary, and (2) matters that without unanimous support would
be in contravention of the agreement. 92 This ignores an important
range of decisions occupying the middle ground between "ordinary"

matters93 and decisions so fundamental as to represent amendments

to the partnership agreement. Representing actions within the scope
88. This parallels the scope of the agency authority of a partner. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
§ 9(l)-(2).
89. Absent a contrary agreement, voting in partnerships is not on the basis of relative
ownership interests. Instead, each partner has one vote.
90. "Any differences arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership
business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no act in contravention of any
agreement between the partners may be done rightfully without the consent of all the
partners." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18 (h); see also id. § 9 (describing the agency powers
of partners and listing acts that require the consent of all partners).
91. See McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or. 257, 393 P.2d 774 (1964) ("Fundamental changes in
a partnership agreement may not be made without the consent of all the parties. This is true
even though the agreement may provide that it can be amended by majority vote. The power
to amend is limited by the rule that, unless unanimous, no amendment may be made in
contravention of the agreement."); see also Note, U.P.A. Section 18(h); Majority Control,
Dissenting Partners, and the Need for Reform, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (1980).
92. This problematic division is not unique to the U.P.A. and was also evident in
commentaries predating the Act. See, e.g., C. BATES, THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 432
(1888); F. BURDICK, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 511-12 (1898); E.
GII.MORI:, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS § 125 (1911). But cf J. STORY,
COMMENTARIF.S ON THE LAW OF PARTINERSHIP 205 (Boston 1859) ("[T]he majority ... have
the right and authority to conduct the partnership business, within the true scope thereof, and
dispose of the partnership property, notwithstanding the dissent of the minority.").
The problem is made even clearer under the English Partnership Act, which provides:
"Any difference as to ordinary matters colnected with the partnership business may be
decided by a majority of the partners, but no change may be made in the nature of the
partnership business without the consent of all existing partners." ENGLISH PARTNFRSHIP
AcT. 1890 53 & 54 Vict., ch. 39, § 24(8).
93. Not surprisingly, there are numerous disputes but no statutory guidelines concerning
the nature of "ordinary" differences resolvable by simple majority vote. See generally A.
BROMItIER(, supra note 8, § 49.
ACT
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of the contemplated business but not so extraordinary as to affect the
basis of the relationship between partners, these decisions defy catego-

rization within the U.P.A.'s guidelines.94 For want of a better term,
they may be described as "middle range decisions." 95
Although the U.P.A. ignores middle range decisions, the limitation of majority rule to ordinary matters effectively results in the
imposition of a unanimity standard for all other decisions. 96 Partners
thus have veto powers over a broad range of decisions, including
many that were not the subjects of their initial agreements. 97 The
breadth of veto powers accorded partners represents one of the more

important and98 distinctive characteristics of the partnership form of

organization.
Apart from interpretive problems arising because of imprecise
drafting of the U.P.A., there remains the more important question of

whether a broad unanimity standard is an appropriate bargain-substitute. Unanimity may seem to represent a principle designed to promote the maintenance of a consensus within a partnership by
encouraging re-bargaining. Undoubtedly, the unanimity standard,
when viewed in isolation from other features of partnership law,
would offer a major device pressuring partners to maintain a consensus. Once again, however, the free dissolvability of partnerships
assumes overriding importance as a stimulant for re-bargaining.
94. In discussing a normative model of decision making within close corporations,
Professor Eisenberg described a comparable range of issues as follows:
The second category consists of decisions which are not in the ordinary
course of business but are nevertheless within the general framework of the
business as it exists when the decision arises. Examples include decisions to
substantially expand plant capacity, to enter into a contract for the sale of a
significant portion of the firm's output, or to recognize a union. Unlike decisions
in the ordinary course, such decisions characteristically involve fairly high
stakes, affect a relatively long timespan, occur with a low degree of frequency
(although, taken as a class, with some regularity), and need not be made on the
spot ....
M. EISENBERG, supra note 86, at 14.
95. This same neglect of the middle range is evident in section 9 of the U.P.A., which
defines the agency power of a partner. After establishing the authority of a partner to act "for
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership," the section then goes
on to describe, with greater specificity than that of section 18(h), matters requiring the consent
of all partners.
96. Cf. A. BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 65, at 381-82 (indicating majority rule extends only
to matters in the ordinary course of business).
97. This assumes that an agreement exists. When a partnership is formed without an
agreement, the U.P.A. classification is even more problematic.
98. A further problem, which will not be addressed in this article, is the degree to which
third parties are affected by the U.P.A.'s norms of decision making. See. e.g., UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(4) ("No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority
shall bind the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.").
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This is clearest in the case of terminable at will partnerships,
where dissolution can be accomplished without the threat of any sanctions imposed by law.99 As has been discussed, re-bargaining in terminable at will, casually established ventures is an activity that is, and
should be, encouraged by the U.P.A. 0 0 Re-bargaining is prompted
when the threat of dissolution seems real. If the threat comes from
the majority, the dissenting minority partner, if she wishes to avoid
dissolution, will relent. A consensus is established, and the appearance of unanimity is maintained, not by virtue of the imposition of a
standard of approval requiring unanimity, but rather because one
partner desires to avoid the adverse consequences of a dissolution.''
Of course, the threat of dissolution will not prompt the same
degree of bargaining if it is in the interests of all partners to maintain
the relationship. Although a unanimity standard may prompt re-bargaining in such a case, the benefits of re-bargaining may be countered
by other interests worthy of protection. When partners have previously engaged in extensive bargaining activities, as is the case in many
fixed term partnerships, there is a limit to the degree to which rebargaining should be encouraged through statutory norms. Other
values, such as stability and order in management decisions, are also
important, and the efficacy of unanimity as a bargain-substitute
becomes more questionable.
If unanimity were not a statutory norm, would most partners
adopt this standard by agreement? Once again, experience gained in
99. All partnerships are freely dissolvable, but dissolution in violation of an agreement
may result in sanctions against the dissolving partners. The sanctions, however, are sometimes
insignificant. See supra note 54.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
101. This desirability of the unanimity standard cannot be evaluated without recognition of
the dissolution potential inherent in all partnerships. Consider in this light the following
example involving a terminable at will partnership formed by A, B, and C. A dispute arises
concerning the purchase of equipment for the partnership that presumably is not an
"ordinary" matter for this business. A and B support the purchase; C is in opposition and,
accordingly, is in a position to block the purchase. But will he? If C exercises his veto, A and
B may choose to dissolve the partnership as a means of eliminating C. If continued
participation is more valuable to C than a dissolution of the partnership, he will relent and
permit the purchase to occur. In this case, the will of the majority prevails even in the face of
an ostensible unanimity requirement.
Now assume that at the inception of the terminable at will partnership the parties did
bargain on one point. They agreed that decisions of the type now at issue will be made by
majority vote. It might therefore appear that each partner has surrendered some of the
bargaining potential that otherwise might be enjoyed if unanimity was required. But is it true
under these circumstances that the will of the majority will prevail over the opposition of a
single partner? Although he has accepted the principle of majority rule, C remains free to
dissolve the partnership. If A and B regard this as both likely and undesirable, they will
modify their decision. Majority rule has shifted to rule by consensus the equivalent of a
unanimity standard.
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the corporate context proves instructive." 2 Unanimity is not a norm
of decision-making in corporations. 103 It is, however, possible in most
jurisdictions for shareholders to elect to operate under supermajority
voting standards, including a standard of unanimity."4 Unquestionably, unanimity provisions, or giving each shareholder a veto over corporate decisions, may prove useful planning devices in providing
protections to minority shareholders. The acceptance of broad unanimity requirements in close corporations, however, is open to question. Even the proponents of this device counsel against its
dangers, t05 and a recent study showed considerable resistance by
lawyers to employing unanimity as a principle of corporate
governance. 106
In short, the strongest case for a unanimity standard occurs with
terminable at will partnerships. These ventures, however, operate
under other pressures imposed by the U.P.A., such as free dissolvability, that may effectively prompt the desirable process of rebargaining. As a norm for management decisions in more long-term
relationships, unanimity is a poor bargain-substitute. Majority
approval should provide a sufficient degree of support for decisions in
the middle range. Only amendments to the partnership agreement
and the most fundamental matters affecting the business need be subjected to the rigors of a unanimity standard.
2.

ALLOCATION OF VOTING POWER

Related to the question of the degree of support required to ratify
business decisions is the issue of how voting power will be allocated
within partnerships. Originally, voting within both corporations and
partnerships was on the basis of one vote for each owner. Corporate
law long ago abandoned this principle in favor of voting on the basis
102. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4.01-.30 (1971).

103. Unanimous approval, however, may still be required to support acts that are ultra
vires, which is a limited doctrine and decreasing in importance. See generally H. HENN AND
A. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 184
(1983). Unanimity may also be relevant to the adoption of shareholder agreements affecting
management. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 186 (West 1977).
Supermajority voting requirements short of unanimity may apply to certain extraordinary
transactions. See, e.g., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. §§ 30-31 (Supp. 1986).
104. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 152-153, 204(a)(9) (West 1977 & Supp. 1986). See
generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 102, § 4.17; Empirical Research Project, supra note 7, at 93439.
105. See, e.g., F. O'NEAI, & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 9.09 (1985).
106. See Empirical Research Study, supra note 7, at 1011; see also F. O'NEAI., supra note
102, § 4.04.
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of relative ownership interests."0 7 One partner, one vote, however,
remains the default norm for partnership voting.
The equal distribution of voting power among partners may seem
to represent a fair basis for business governance. Indeed, it is unobjectionable for the large number of egalitarian partnerships in which the
contributions and interests of partners are equal. In these types of
partnerships, it makes no difference whether each partner is entitled
to one vote or whether voting is allocated on the basis of ownership
interests; under either system, the allocation of voting power would
remain the same. The question concerning the adequacy of the statutory norm as a bargain-substitute concerns those partnerships in
which ownership interests are not identical. In ventures of disproportionate ownership interests, partners may assume, incorrectly, that
voting power will correspond with relative interests in profits. ' 8 This
assumption would not be unreasonable, for that is exactly the mode of
voting in close corporations.
A norm offering a more sensible bargain-substitute would allocate voting power on the basis of relative interests in profits and
losses. In egalitarian partnerships, where profits and losses are shared
equally, this would have no effect on voting. In nonegalitarian partnerships, it would give partners with greater stakes voting power corresponding with their interests. This is more likely to conform with
the assumptions of partners than the present default norm on voting.
3.

FURTHER EVALUATIONS

Undoubtedly, many of the U.P.A.'s default norms prove sensible
bargain-substitutes for partners. Some, however, do not fill this function well. Until more comprehensive review of these aged norms is
accomplished, claims asserting the efficacy of modern partnership law
must be viewed with suspicion.
IV.

FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRIVATE ORDERING

The status of partners as fiduciaries with respect to each other is
an established tenet of partnership law.'0 9 But what does it mean
107. See, e.g., V. MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 476(a) (1886).
108. Cf J. STORY, supra note 92, § 123, at 205 ("[T]he general rule would seem to be, that
each partner has an equal voice, however unequal the shares of the respective partners may be,
because in such a case, each partner has a right to an equal share of the profits.") (emphasis
added).
109. See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 68; Beane, The Fiduciary Relationship of
a Partner,5 J. CORP. L. 483 (1980); Note, FiduciaryDuties of Partners,48 IOWA L. REV. 902

(1963).
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when we label a partner a fiduciary and what functions are served in
measuring the conduct of a partner against strict fiduciary stan-

dards?' 1o And what is the basis for and limitations on applying fiduciary standards to a relationship that is essentially contractual in
nature?
The relationship between fiduciary standards and bargaining
within partnerships is one of the more important aspects of partner-

ship law. If bargaining is truly effective as a means of private ordering, the role of fiduciary standards should be limited to insuring
proper conditions for bargaining. Under this rather narrow, supple-

mental approach, fiduciary responsibilities would preclude deceitful
activities, such as theft and embezzlement, and promote full disclosure in dealings among partners. If, on the other hand, bargaining
fails to provide an adequate basis for private ordering, then standards
of fiduciary responsibility may assume greater importance and in fact
supersede bargaining in providing a framework for regulating the
relationships between partners.
One of the problems of evaluating the role of fiduciary standards
is the marked absence of reasoning on this subject in case law. Too
often, reported cases begin with a proclamation of the status of partners as fiduciaries, continue with rather colorful and exaggerated
rhetoric intended to buttress this conclusion, and conclude with a
finding that a partner has, or has not, fulfilled his responsibilities.
What is missing is a refinement of the meaning of, and reason for,
enforcement of an imposed code of conduct on partners,"'I and, more
importantly, an explicit recognition of limitations on the use of fiduci110. "[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins [the] analysis, it gives direction to
further inquiry. To whom he is a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In
what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of
his deviation from duty?" SEC v. Cherney Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
111. This problem is shared with corporate law:
The usefulness and actual effect of such an umbrella term to designate so
many different kinds of individuals in divergent capacities with duties of differing
character and intensity may well be seriously questioned. The concept of a
"fiduciary" may serve as a useful legal fiction to stimulate development of new or
expanding obligations by analogy to the seminal concept of the trustee. On the
other hand, clarity of description and precision in defining duties might at this
stage be better achieved through abandonment of so amorphous a term in favor
of developing a more precise set of notions of duty and responsibility in
connection with each of the separate capacities now lumped within the broad and
nebulous term "fiduciary."
Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883,
887 (1976). The corporate law literature on fiduciary responsibilities is extensive. See, e.g..
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Coi.url. L.
Rirv. 1403 (1985); Chirelstein, Towards a Federal Fiduciary Standards Act, 30 Ci.i-v. Si. L.
Ri.v. 203 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YAi:- L.J. 698
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ary standards 2to preclude all attempts at private advantage within
partnerships. "1
The following discussion will explore the relationship between
bargaining and fiduciary responsibilities and consider the degree to
which fiduciary standards can regulate the quest for private advantage
within partnerships.
A.

Standards in Search of a Premise

A paramount difficulty in any assessment of fiduciary responsibilities under partnership law is identifying the premise underlying
the imposition of this code of conduct. The following discussion suggests that fiduciary standards may be justified under four lines of reasoning that both overlap and, to some degree, reflect inconsistent
objectives.
1.

MORAL MANDATE

There is a moral theme to the concept of fiduciary responsibilities." 3 It may thus be argued that the close relationships and mutual
trust supposedly characteristic of partnerships require the development of legal principles insuring impeccable conduct by business partners. 1 4 Partners are entrusted" 5 with the fortunes of their
colleagues. Uncompromised good faith, minimization of self-interest,
and furtherance of the collective good, should, under this view, be the
principles guiding the behavior of partners." 16
The morality component of fiduciary standards can be supported
as an attempt to effectuate intentions of contracting partners; as such,
it could readily be incorporated within the bargain-substitute
approach discussed below." 7 The tone, enthusiasm, and uniformity
evident in judicial expressions of the standard, however, suggest a life
for the moral mandate imposed on fiduciaries independent of the
expectations and assumptions of the "average" partner. Even the
(1982); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAW. 35 (1966). See also U.P.A. REVISION SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 78-79.
112. The nondisclosure cases provide, perhaps, exceptions to this criticism. See infra text
accompanying notes 140-50.
113. Cf Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 829-30 (1983) ("Courts regulate
fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an
important part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic
vocabulary.").
114. Many extend this argument to close corporations. See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249
F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
115. See Frankel, supra note 113, at 800 n.17.
116. See infra notes 122-24.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 130-37.
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U.P.A. does not clearly relegate fiduciary responsibilities to the status
of default norms," 8 although partners can and do bargain on the
subject. I19
This morality theme is reflected in much of the language of
reported decisions, and courts have consistently articulated a high
standard against which the conduct of partners is to be measured.
Judge Cardozo bears much of the responsibility, and his statement on
this issue, although dictum, is one of the most frequently quoted and
elegant formulations of the law:
[Partners] owe to one another ... the duty of finest loyalty. Many

forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting
at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this, there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty ....

Only

thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a higher
level than that trodden by the crowd.' 2 °
118. References to fiduciary responsibilities appear only in section 21 of the U.P.A., which
provides:
(1) Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners
from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of
the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
(2) This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner engaged
in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal representative of
the last surviving partner.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (emphasis added).
119. They do this by obtaining the consent of other partners to conduct that might be
considered objectionable under fiduciary standards. See, e.g., Ben-Dashan v. Plitt, 58 A.D.2d
244, 396 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1977). This is contemplated by the language of section 21 of the
U.P.A. See supra note I I& See generally Reynolds, Loyalty and the Limited Partnership, 34
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 12 (1985) ("To the extent disclosure of a questioned transaction is
characterized as leading to an implication of consent by the other partners, the transaction will
be given effect. The substantive fairness of the questioned transaction is not in issue; or, the
issue of the transaction's fairness is subsumed into the finding of agreement."). This seems to
be particularly common in limited partnerships, and may approach standard practice in large,
public syndications of limited partnership interests. See, e.g., Bassan v. Investment Exch.
Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922. 524 P.2d 233 (1974). In many cases, the disclosures precede likely
Jiiture conflicts of interest, and we can question the degree to which consent is bargained for
under these circumstances. For an example of a prospectus including disclosures of future
conflicts in interest, see A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS, & S. SIEGEi., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION
457-58 (1982) (The authors precede the excerpted agreement with the question: What remains
of the fiduciary obligation of the general partners?).
For further discussion of disclosure components of fiduciary responsibilities, see infta text
accompanying notes 140-50.
120. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545. 546 (1928).
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Cardozo was not alone. Rhetorical statements on this issue abound,
with such comments as "there is no stronger fiduciary relation known
to the law than that of a copartnership"'' 2 and admonitions concerning the duty of "utmost good faith"12 2 dominating judicial analyses of
fiduciary responsibilities. The fervor of such statements and the
unqualified manner in which they are offered suggest a moral mandate that no partner may attempt to secure any private advantage at
1 23
the expense of other partners.
Although colorful,12 1 the judicial rhetoric inevitably overstates
the standard of conduct the law actually imposes on partners. If partners truly are fiduciaries, they are a unique species of this group and
cannot be subjected to traditional standards applicable to other types
of fiduciaries. The very concept of "fiduciary" connotes undivided
loyalty and disinterested representation. 125 In theory, a fiduciary is a
principal to whom another entrusts money. 2 6 The fiduciary as joint
owner, although not unknown, is something of a contradiction in
terms. Partners, on the other hand, are always joint owners. 27 The
principal objective of each is to maximize personal gain. Partners are
not disinterested trustees, and the likelihood that most partners operate under a "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"'' 2 1 standard is
29
remote. 1
121. Salhinger v. Salhinger, 56 Wash. 134, 137, 105 P. 236, 237 (1909).
122. The case law is too voluminous to cite in full. See, e.g., Couri v. Couri, 95 11. 2d 91,
94, 447 N.E.2d 334, 337 (1983) ("utmost good faith and honesty"); Moser v. Williams, 443
S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Veale v. Rose, 657 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.
1983) ("utmost degree of good faith and honesty"); Barker v. Smith, 294 S.E.2d 919, 926 (W.
Va. 1982) ("highest degree of good faith").
123. See, e.g., Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893) (a partner "cannot carry on the
business of the partnership for his private advantage"); Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 197, 359
P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 646 (1961) ("We have often stated that partners are trustees for
each other, and in all proceedings connected with the conduct of the partnership every partner
is bound to act in the highest good faith to his copartner, and may not obtain any advantage
over him by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any
kind.").
124. See, e.g., Fouchek v. Janicek, 190 Or. 251, 225 P.2d 783, 793 (1950) ("The true rule is:
When a partner wrongfully snatches a seed of opportunity from the granary of his firm, he
cannot, thereafter, excuse himself from sharing with his copartners the fruits of its planting,
even though the harvest occurs after they have terminated their association.").
125. See Beane, supra note 109, at 486-87. This is reaffirmed in frequent references to
partners as "trustees." See. e.g., Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 197, 359 P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 643, 646 (1961). But cf RESTAT'Mt'NT (SECOND) OF' AGENCY § 13 comment a (1958)
("The agreement to act on behalf of the principal causes the agent to be a fiduciary, that is. a
person having a duty ... to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters connected with
his undertaking.") (emphasis added).
126. See Frankel, supra note 113, at 800.
127. UNIF. PR'INERS[IP ACT § 6(1).
128. See supra tcxt accompanying note 120.

129. A number of commentators have recognized that application of broad fiduciary
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2.

BARGAIN-SUBSTITUTES

A somewhat different justification for fiduciary standards
attempts to accommodate an imposed code of conduct with the bargaining process. 3 ' Arguably, partners implicitly accept fiduciary
standards as part of their bargained-out arrangements. Legal standards in the form of fiduciary rules lower the costs of contracting and
"approximate the bargain the parties themselves would have reached
had they been able to negotiate at low cost."'' Under this view, the
conduct of a partner should be measured not against a rigid moral
standard but rather in light of its conformity to the type of agreement
that would32have been reached if the partners contracted explicitly on
the issue. 1
a. Moral Mandate and Bargain-Substitute Approaches
Distinguished
Although they overlap, the morality and implied bargain
approaches to fiduciary responsibility may yield inconsistent results.
The moral mandate view lends itself more readily to the application of
strict, and possibly inflexible, standards of conduct. In defining fiduciary responsibilities, courts are free to borrow from the development
of standards applied to fiduciaries in other contexts. Although some
misconduct by partners may frequently escape regulation under this
approach, the rigor of the standard may have an in terrorem effect in
prompting some partners to act more "honorably" than they would if
subject to a weaker code of behavior.
Evaluating the implied bargain, on the other hand, permits a
more flexible development of fiduciary standards specifically tailored
to partnerships and the conflicts of interests inherent in these ventures. 33 Standards developed to regulate other fiduciaries would not
control the conduct expected of partners. For this reason, the bargain-substitute approach tolerates a greater degree of self-interest pursuit than would be allowed of more disinterested fiduciaries, such as
trustees. It therefore offers some promise as a basis for the development of more predictable and realistic rules regulating the conduct of
partners and providing a framework for bargaining.
principles varies depending upon the contexts in which they are being enforced. See. e.g.,
Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949).
130. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 291-97.
131. Id. at 291.
132. "If a court is unavoidably entwined in a dispute, it must decide what the parties would
have bargained for had they written a completely contingent contract." Id. at 293.
133. But cf Frankel, supra note 113, 832-36 (arguing for a single fiduciary law applicable
to all who occupy this status).
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Bargain-Specific Versus Bargain-General

The bargain substitute approach is in need of further refinements.
For example, whether the analysis is bargain-specific, focusing on
how a particular set of partners would have resolved the issue, or bargain-general, evaluating how mythical "reasonable" partners would
have responded, will have important consequences for the form in
which fiduciary principles develop and the responses of partners to
those standards.
The bargain-specific analysis represents a methodology more
consistent with traditional views of partnership law because it
attempts to implement specific, albeit hypothetical, bargains. Any
deviation from that fabricated past bargain requires consent, which in
turn activates the bargaining process. If partners are able to construct, without the assistance of courts, the fictional agreements under
which they operate and which no longer prove satisfactory, the bargain-specific approach accommodates ongoing bargaining as a means
of private ordering within partnerships.
The bargain-specific approach does present some problems. The
task of reconstructing nonexistent bargains is both imposing and arbitrary. The timing is also problematic, for the determination of the
content of the bargain, a judicial function, occurs in the course of
litigation and at a point when re-bargaining may effectively be foreclosed. Moreover, if truly applied as an attempt to construct specific
bargains, the bargain-specific approach limits courts to an ad hoc dispute resolution role and precludes the development of principles that
can be applied more systematically.
A further problem is that the bargain-specific approach emphasizes the past. Presumably, the "bargain" under this analysis is determined late in the life of a partnership with reference to a fictional
agreement developed at the beginning of the venture. This retrospective character of the bargain-substitute approach is consistent with
traditional views of partnership bargaining as an activity largely preceding formation of a partnership. If applied in this fashion, however,
the approach exalts the past and ignores the effect of post-commencement developments that might have led to an entirely different bargain between the partners. 134
By focusing on the expectations partners generally have with
respect to the standard of conduct for their colleagues and measuring
the conduct of specific partners against that standard, the bargain134. The criticism is more applicable to the bargain-specific than the bargain-general
approaches described in this section.
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general approach avoids the retrospective orientation of the bargainspecific mode and offers promise as a basis for the development of a
more systematic code of conduct for partners. Because it implicitly
denigrates specific bargains in the effort to develop more broadly
applied principles, however, the bargain-general approach is inconsistent with the exalted role accorded specific agreements under partnership law.' 35 For this reason, the "bargain-general" label is
misleading. Misnomer aside, the approach does offer the advantage of
providing, through the development of standards, a clear default reference point from which partners may depart, if they so choose,
through bargaining. The standards may be both procedural and substantive in character. More modern close corporation statutes may
prove useful, although somewhat limited, models in this regard.' 36
Whether rules capable of systematic application will emerge
from a bargain-general approach, however, is open to some question.
If bargain-general evaluations develop utilizing only a fairness standard to measure conduct, '" and if judicial opinions are not supported
by adequate reasoning so as to have some value as precedents, then
the approach will reflect the same ad hoc and arbitrary qualities limiting the usefulness of bargain-specific evaluations. If, on the other
hand, the bargain-general approach prompts more systematic rule
development, then it may offer a useful basis for refining and clarifying partnership law's fiduciary standards.
In short, the bargain-specific approach promotes ad hoc dispute
resolution and is consistent with the exalted role assigned the initial
agreement under partnership law. The bargain-general discounts the
agreement that might have been developed by a particular group of
partners and seeks instead to fashion principles for general application
based upon mythical reasonable partners. Ideally, the guidelines are
developed systematically, and if this occurs, their predictive qualities
would enhance bargaining within partnerships.
135. An alternative would permit an amalgamation of the two approaches. A court could
follow a bargain-general resolution unless it determines that there is something unique about
the relationship between a given set of partners justifying a bargain-specific means of resolving
the dispute.

136. See, e.g.,

REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

§§ 8.31-.32 (1984) (Director Conflict

of Interest and Loans to Directors); CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977) (Contracts in Which
Director Has Material Financial Interest; Validity). Although these statutes are sometimes
described as regulating "conflicts of interest," they cover only some transactions that might

fall within this description. For a good analysis of the types of "conflicts" that occur in the
corporate setting, see Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 57-73 (1966).
137. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
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FAIRNESS

Another view of fiduciary responsibilities is that partners should
treat each other fairly. 38 The standard of "fairness" is sufficient, proponents argue, to permit courts to achieve justice in the wide variety
of disputes with which they are faced; greater specificity, the argument continues, is not worth the cost .... 139
Undoubtedly, developing a comprehensive "code" of fiduciary
responsibility would prove both costly and futile. The other extreme
of simply delegating to courts the tasks of making ad hoc and unsystematic evaluations of fairness, however, is also unacceptable. What
do we mean when we require partners to act "fairly," and how can
such a vague standard provide any reasonable guidance for partners?
More precisely, does the concept of fairness preclude any attempt to
secure private advantage within a partnership? What is the relationship between fairness and the continuous bargaining that takes place
within a partnership? Is fairness simply a pseudonym for disclosure?
The need for flexibility does not preclude development of an underlying framework for addressing the inevitable conflict between partners
as individuals and partners as members of a collective.
As the starting point for developing a standard, "fairness" is
unobjectionable. Indeed, a more developed standard of fairness may
offer advantages over the moral mandate and bargain substitute
approaches discussed above. Unlike the moral mandate approach, a
fairness standard may accept, as any realistic standard must, that
partners will pursue their self-interests and that the principal objectives of fiduciary standards under partnership law should be to provide a check on the more abusive aspects of the quest for private
advantage. In contrast to the bargain substitute approach, a fairness
inquiry need not be limited to the partnership bargain, whether real,
imagined, or imposed. Holding partners to their original bargains
may in some cases produce unjust results; this may occur, for example, when those first agreements fail to anticipate the effect of changing conditions on the relationships between partners. If fairness is a
138. See, e.g., W. KLEIN & J.
139.

COFFEE, supra note

29, at 69-77.

Outcomes in decided cases can be recited to provide examples of conduct that
has been found to be on one side of the line or the other. Yet the line remains
unclear, the vagueness remains- perhaps unavoidably so, since the principle is
designed to cover situations of such wide variety that it would be impractical to
try to anticipate and provide clearer rules even for those most likely to occur.
Greater specificity is simply not worth the cost.

Id. at 70. The commentary following this statement is well worth reading. Id. at 70-77.
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superseding principle, it significantly affects the process of bargaining
as a means of private ordering within partnerships.
Absent much more thorough and diverse considerations of this
rather basic question concerning the role of law in facilitating or supplanting private ordering among business partners, conclusions concerning the impossibility of more systematic development of the
fairness standard are premature. The attractiveness of the fairness
standard lies in its promise rather than its contributions to date.
4.

DISCLOSURE

Nondisclosure is perhaps the most characteristic feature of fiduciary responsibility litigation. The essence of the obligation to share
information is found not in the narrow provisions of the U.P.A.
in the "fiduciary" quality of the
addressing disclosures, 140 but rather
14
relationship between partners.
Nondisclosure need not be combined with other misconduct to
constitute a breach of fiduciary responsibilities.142 Indeed, in the very
143
decision in which he gave us the "punctilio of honor" standard,
Cardozo stressed not the attempt for private advantage but rather the
secrecy surrounding that activity as the essence of the culpable participant's wrongdoing. 144 Had this individual simply disclosed his
140. For the most part, these provisions emphasize passive rather than affirmative
disclosure duties. See. e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 19 ("The partnership books shall be
kept, subject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of business of the
partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any
of them."); id. § 20 ("Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all things
affecting the partnership to any partner .... "); see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 22 (the
right to the account suggests an affirmative obligation to disclose); cf Fouchek v. Janicek, 190
Or. 251, 225 P.2d 783, 792 (1950) ("Good faith not only requires that a partner should not
make any false statements to his partners, but also that he should abstain from any false
concealment.").
141. See, e.g., Vogel v. Brewer, 176 F. Supp. 892 (D. Ark. 1959); Marsh v. Gentry, 642
S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982); Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J. 251, 113 A.2d 679 (1955); Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928); Fouchek v. Janicek, 190 Or. 251, 225 P.2d 783
(1950) (treating information as an asset of the partnership); Bovy v. Graham, Cohen &
Wampold, 17 Wash. App. 567, 64 P.2d 1175 (1977); see also Reynolds, supra note 119, at I 112 ("In the general partnership cases . . . the inquiry generally stops with an evaluation of
disclosure. If there is no disclosure and a given transaction can be characterized as leading to a
.secret profit,' the ensuing accounting in favor of the uninformed partner is nearly
automatic.").
142. Nondisclosure, however, may resolve doubts concerning the acceptability of conduct
and render wrongful otherwise marginal activities.
143. See supra text accompanying note 120.
144. The case involved a joint venture that operated a hotel under a long-term lease. The
two venturers were Salmon, the manager, and Meinhard, the passive investor. As the lease
neared expiration, one of the venturers secretly and for his own benefit negotiated a new lease
on a large block of property, including the site of the hotel; the lease required substantial
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intention to abandon the venture 145 and exploit the opportunity alone,
his conduct apparently would have risen above the "morals of the
marketplace," and his "duty of finest loyalty" would have been fulfilled. 46 Thus, otherwise acceptable conduct may become wrongful if
shrouded in secrecy. 147
What objectives are advanced through disclosure obligations?
Whether disclosure requirements stand alone or merely as a part of
the more comprehensive moral mandate and bargain-substitute
approaches, 14 1 it is the consequences of disclosure, rather than the
mere act of disseminating information, that supports disclosure obligations as a component of fiduciary responsibility. 149 Disclosure
levels the playing field and prompts response, which in turn may profoundly affect private ordering, or re-ordering, within the partnership. ' " So viewed, disclosure performs an important function in
facilitating bargaining.
Its effectiveness in performing this function, however, should not
be overstated. The disclosure standard presupposes supplementary
redevelopment activities. Meinhard learned of the transaction only after the new lease had
been signed:
The pre-emptive privilege, or, better, the pre-emptive opportunity, that was thus
an incident of the enterprise, Salmon appropriated to himself in secrecy and
silence. He might have warned Meinhard that the plan had been submitted, and
that either would be free to compete for the award. If he had done this, we do
not need to say whether he would have been under a duty ... to hold the lease so
acquired for the benefit of a venture then about to end, and thus prolong by
indirection its responsibilities and duties. The trouble about his conduct is that
he excluded his coadventurer from any chance to compete, from any chance to
enjoy the opportunity for benefit that had come to him alone by virtue of his
agency. This chance, if nothing more, he was under a duty to concede.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 460, 164 N.E. 545, 547 (1928).
145. Since the venture was about to end, it is comparable to a terminable at will
partnership.
146. Admittedly, Cardozo was somewhat ambiguous on this point. See supra note 144.
147. See also Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1982) ("Had [the nondisclosing
partner] made a full disclosure to his partner of his intentions to purchase the partnership
property, [the other partner] would not later be heard to complain of the transaction.").
148. Although nondisclosure may itself be sufficient to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty
by a partner, disclosure alone is not sufficient to embrace all responsibilities of partners as
fiduciaries.
149. This portion of the discussion largely assumes disclosures are made at a time
coincident with the transactions to which they relate; disclosures of possible future
transactions, however, may also occur at the time a partnership is established. See supra note
119.
150. Disclosure may, for example, prompt other partners to (1) pursue opportunities
otherwise restricted by their fiduciary obligations, (2) disclaim the continuance of their
partnership and seek dissolution, (3) eliminate from the venture the partner whose activities
exceed accepted limits on the pursuit of self-interest, (4) capture gains properly those of the
partnership, (5) block through litigation conduct they perceive as objectionable, or (6) consent
to the transaction, perhaps exacting concessions if their bargaining leverage is sufficient.
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principles defining the type of conduct that must be disclosed. At one
extreme, theft presents the obvious case; more subtle forms of the pursuit of self-interest, however, are problematic. Even assuming an
understanding of the circumstances under which disclosure is
required, it does not follow that the "consent" sufficient to ratify conduct will represent an arms length and willing concurrence by equal
partners. For a variety of reasons, some of which are discussed below,
securing consent may prove a perfunctory event without elements of
bargaining.
B.

The Role of FiduciaryResponsibilities in FacilitatingPrivate
Ordering within Partnerships

Partners pursue their self-interests. They do so in the development of an agreement establishing their partnerships, and they do so
throughout the lives of their ventures. This takes place even in the
face of a continuous stream of judicial opinions exhorting partners to
subordinate their self-interests to the collective good.
Even without regard to the excesses of rhetoric, it is easy to overstate the importance of fiduciary responsibilities in controlling the
conduct of partners. In many ways, the very individuals the fiduciary
standard is intended to protect face very significant disincentives to
asserting a claim based upon supposed improper conduct by one of
their co-partners. Generally, litigation of fiduciary issues is confined
to the dissolution phase of a partnership's life.' 5 ' A partner otherwise satisfied with her venture may face a hard choice in deciding
whether to continue the partnership or destroy the venture as52a means
of seeking relief for objectionable conduct by a co-partner.
Partners may, of course, secure ratification of their conduct
through bargaining. These are the cases that never achieve the status
of reported litigation. To secure the consent of other partners, the
partner proposing to act may be forced to make concessions concerning either his actions or other aspects of his relationship with the
other partners. Initiation of bargaining displays willingness to accept
151. "[T]he general partnership typically enters the case reports in something of a post
mortem posture. Death, dissension, and other contingencies having arisen, the partners

personally go to equity to divide up the leftovers." Reynolds, supra note 119, at 10-11. This is
largely because of case law precluding litigation between partners prior to a complete

accounting and making dissolutions prerequisites to such accountings. See generally A.
supra note 8, §§ 69-72. Courts often are reluctant to interfere in disputes between
partners. See, e.g., Schuler v. Birnbaum, 62 A.D.2d 461, 405 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1978); see also
U.P.A. REVISION SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13, 58-59, & 80.
152. To many, litigation is a process antithetical to the close trust and cooperation
supposedly required of partners. This generalization is dangerous, however, for the success of
some ventures is not in the least dependant upon cooperation between the partners.
BROMBERG,
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costs. The broader the scope of fiduciary responsibilities, the greater
the price charged for the pursuit of self-interest.
The difficult question is identifying the type of conduct that
might, without the consent of other partners, be proscribed under
fiduciary standards. Most successful challenges to the actions of
fiduciaries fall within a category that may loosely be described as
"misappropriation" of partnership assets. The line between "misappropriation" and acceptable "appropriation" is not well defined. As
the following discussion will demonstrate, partners may pursue their
self-interests in a wide variety of cases free of the restrictions imposed
by their status as fiduciaries.
C.

The Quest for Private Advantage

To test the limits of the fiduciary principle in limiting the pursuit
of private advantage, the following Rule Against Pursuit of Private
Advantage provides a useful reference point:
No partner may without the consent of all other partners secure
gain, arisingfrom his position as a partner, not shared with other
partners.

The Rule, which is suggested by some of the more extreme statements
in opinions concerning fiduciary responsibilities, is offered only for
purposes of testing the limits of applying strict fiduciary standards to
partners. As will be seen, broad application of the Rule is unworkable, and the principle it enunciates controls only certain types of abusive conduct by partners.
For purposes of assessing the efficacy of the Rule, assume A and
B have formed a partnership. They bargained only on the manner in
which profits would be divided and agreed on an equal division of
income. 53 Since they did not establish a duration for their venture,
the partnership is terminable at will.
Three scenarios follow. Each represents a pattern of conduct not
unknown to partners.
1.

A MISAPPROPRIATION SCENARIO

A has learned of an attractive opportunity within the scope of the
partnership's business. Without telling his partner, A pursues the
opportunity alone and diverts a number of the partnership's customers to his new business. The partnership's income drops substantially
as a result of A's actions.
153. This result would also have applied under the default norm. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 18(a). The scenario references bargaining on the issue, however, to demonstrate the
importance of the profit division formula to the parties.
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This presents a rather simple "misappropriation" case. A's
breach is clear, and B presumably has an incentive to seek recompense in the final partnership accounting. This example does not test
the limits of the Rule Against Pursuit of Private Advantage.
2.

A SQUEEZE OUT SCENARIO

The facts may now be modified to illustrate the more subtle types
of misappropriations that may escape the constraints of fiduciary
duties. Assume A correctly realizes that B, through no fault of her
own, is not indispensable to the success of the business. A dissolves
the partnership. Following the dissolution, the assets are liquidated
and purchased by A. ' 54 Prior to the liquidation, A refrains from taking
any actions designed to benefit himself at the expense of B. Accordingly, B cannot complain of A's lack of candor or, with the possible
exception of the squeeze out and its consequences, 55 compliance with
'
fiduciary responsibilities. 56
One response is that B suffers no harm because the liquidation of
the partnership's assets provides the basis for a fair settlement of her
account. For good reason, B may disagree. What exactly is the nature
of the assets being liquidated, and how is the value of those assets
determined? Assets are both tangible and intangible. Tangible assets,
such as chairs, typewriters, and real estate are easy to identify,
although it may be questionable whether their value is realizable
under distress sale circumstances.' 5 7 More problematic is realizing
the "going concern value" of this business. A large component of that
value may lie in A's continued participation in the business. So long
154. Often, asset liquidations by partnerships do not even attract outside bidders. See A.
supra note 8, § 83A. The technique of squeezing out participants is better known
in the corporate setting, where dissolution is often followed by the acquisition of the assets by a
BROMBERG,

corporation owned by some, but not all, of the former business partners. See generally F.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 105, § 5.21; Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolution-A New

Development in IntracorporateAbuse, 51 YALE L.J. 64 (1942).
155. The squeeze out is more widely studied in the corporate setting. See generally F.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 105, § 5.21; Hornstein, supra note 154.
156. For example, A does not attempt prior to the dissolution and winding up to divert
business from the partnership to his new venture. This is intended to distinguish the scenario
from other cases in which partners have acted improperly to secure advantages in anticipation
of dissolutions. See, e.g., Leffv. Gunther, 33 Cal. 3d 508, 516-17, 658 P.2d 740, 746, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 383 (1983) (an opinion containing broad language concerning post-dissolution
appropriation of partnership opportunities, but adding, "From the evidence in the instant
matter, the jury could well have concluded that defendants secretly began work on their
") (emphasis added):
independent bid during their participation in the joint venture ....
Fouchek v. Janicek, 190 Or. 251, 225 P.2d 783 (1950) (participant secretly used information
obtained while a partner to preempt partnership opportunity).
157. This is particularly true when there are no outside parties bidding on the assets. See
supra note 154.
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as the partnership continues, this asset is jointly owned by the two
partners. In the liquidation following dissolution, however, the value
of the asset to B is reduced to zero, for neither B nor third-party bidders can capture the value of A's services without his cooperation.
Under these circumstances, A 's services are worthless to all potential
parties other than A who need not compensate B to capture for his
own benefit the full value of this partnership asset.
Is this a misappropriation of partnership assets, and do fiduciary
standards provide a check on the use of dissolution as a squeeze out
technique? Opinions are both confused and split on the issue,
although for the most part they provide more support than discouragement for the dissolving partner.'
In our scenario, one factor mit158. In Page v. Page, the California Supreme Court in dictum warned a partner not to
attempt dissolution as a means of eliminating another partner at a bargain price:
[P]laintiff has the power to dissolve the partnership by express notice to the
defendant. If, however, it is proved that plaintiff acted in bad faith and violated
his fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to his own use the new
prosperity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his co-partner,
the dissolution would be wrongful and the plaintiff would be liable . . . for
violation of the implied agreement not to exclude defendant wrongfully from the
partnership business opportunity.
55 Cal. 2d 192, 197-98, 359 P.2d 41, 45, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 647 (1961). I criticized Page in
Hillman, supra note 14, at 28-33.
Shawn v. England, 570 P.2d 628, 633 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) presents a concrete application of the Page dictum. In Shawn, a partner was eliminated from the venture immediately
prior to the publication of a book: "[D]efendants used the efforts and mental ability of the
plaintiff for as long as they thought they needed him and then, when they got their book about
ready to publish and thought they had marketing arrangements made, arbitrarily decided to
eliminate his interest in joint venture assets by terminating it." Id. at 633. Because the partnership involved was formed for a narrow purpose and the motives of the excluding partners
were so blatant, Shawn represents an extreme case. While a Page-type analysis may work well
in a simple case such as this, squeeze outs for the more general purpose of eliminating a participant from a long-term venture are difficult to regulate under a "good faith" standard.
In contrast to Page is Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820 (1975). In Nicholes, a
squeeze out was accomplished without the formality of a liquidation. The court summarily
rejected challenges to the fairness of the treatment of the excluded partner: "Assuming that
there was [a Page-type] duty of good faith in this case, the evidence proves that the defendant
[partner] acted in good faith and did not act in contravention of the oral partnership at will."
Id. at 263-64, 41 P.2d at 824; cf Frank v. R.A. Dickens & Son Co., 264 Ark. 307, 572 S.W.2d
133 (1978) (squeeze out at book value based upon expulsion agreement upheld).
Cude v. Couch, 588 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1979), is also inconsistent with Page. In that case,
the dissolving partner owned the building occupied by the partnership, refused to lease it to
anyone wishing to continue the business, purchased the assets through an undisclosed agent,
and continued the business with his son. The court nevertheless concluded there had been no
breach of fiduciary duties: "Unquestionably, [the dissolving partner] had an advantage,
divorced from the partnership, that made it more practicable for him to carry on the business
of the partnership after dissolution than for others. However, the fact that [he] benefited from
that circumstance harmed neither [the other partner] nor the partnership, and breached his
duty to neither." Id. at 556. The transaction "shocked the conscience" of the dissent: "[The
dissolving partner] has appropriated to his own use and benefit the goodwill of a going busi-
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igating against finding a breach is the terminable at will nature of the
partnership. B could have bargained for a fixed term, but she did not.
B therefore accepted from the outset that this type of development
might occur.'5 9 Stated another way, B impliedly consented in
advance to her ouster from the business. Such an inference of consent, of course, will come as a surprise to B, and extension of bargaining theory to this type of situation seems fanciful.
From B's perspective, A hardly resembles a fiduciary who has
acted with the "punctilio of honor most sensitive," the "utmost good
faith," the "finest loyalty," or with collective rather than self-interests
in mind. A quite different question, however, is whether A has acted
rationally. The elimination of B from the venture seems sensible and
may result in economic efficiencies the law perhaps should
encourage. '6 But is this sufficient to satisfy A's fiduciary responsibility to B?
For present purposes, it is sufficient to call this a close question.
The mere fact that it is close, however, suggests important limitations
on the scope of a partner's fiduciary responsibilities and undermines

significantly the efficacy of the Rule Against Pursuit of Private
Advantage. The following scenario illustrates this point.
3.

A DOMINATION/REALLOCATION SCENARIO

As a rational person, A has a price at which he is willing to forgo
ness, for which the most elementary principles of equity and fair play demand that he pay just
and reasonable compensation." Id. at 557 (Henry, J., dissenting).
159. It may also occur, however, in a fixed term partnership. Assume the partnership was
established for a period often years and the term had not yet expired. A's dissolution would be
wrongful. He would be liable to B for damages, but this may prove problematic. See supra
note 54. B could avoid a liquidation by continuing the business alone or with a new partner; in
this case, A's account settlement would not reflect his interest in the goodwill. UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2). IfA was the key actor in the business, however, the possibility of a
continuation without A may be remote. If the business is not continued, the assets will
probably be liquidated, and A may prove the successful bidder.
Probably more than any other aspect of partnership law, the evaluation of the free
dissolvability principle as applied to fixed term partnerships requires consideration of the
nature of a promise and the remedy for its breach. Is a promise a moral obligation? Or is a
promise merely a commitment on the part of the promisor to pay damages in the event under
the defined condition of breach of promise? Should the promisor always be given the ability to
"buy out" of his duty? If so, how can this view be reconciled with the "utmost good faith and
loyalty" that, at least in theory, is expected of partners?
Scholars of contract law have intensely debated the issue of whether a promise should be
treated as a moral obligation. Much of this debate has occurred in recent years. The principle
of free dissolvability of partnerships, however, was formulated without the benefit of more
modern views on the issue. It reflects elements of both sides of the question, and firmly
embraces neither. See generally Hillman, supra note 30, at 707-21.
160. The efficiency gain may result from awarding the assets to the partner most capable of
effectively utilizing them. This point, however, would benefit from further development.
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a squeeze out of B. Let us assume that price is a reallocation of the
income distribution formula to provide A with an eighty percent interest in profits. This, of course, requires the consent of B.
Naturally, B would prefer to continue the venture under the original profit sharing agreement; maintenance of the status quo is in her
interest, and this will be her primary concern when A attempts to
pursue his self-interest and re-order the partnership through bargaining. This process of bargaining represents an attempt by each partner
to advance self, rather than collective, interests. If the cost of reordering is less to B than the cost, including lost income, of terminating the venture, she will agree. She will not be happy, but she will
nevertheless agree because continuation of the partnership is in her

interest.161
What happened to the "trustee" and "loyalty" components of
the relationship between partners? Has A misappropriated partnership assets?' 6 2 And how do we reconcile A 's pursuit of his self-interest with the principle that a partner. as a fiduciary, may not obtain
any advantage over another "by the slightest misrepresentation
con63
cealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind"?1

The questions are rhetorical. The Rule Against Pursuit of Private Advantage will not be applied to this type of situation; fiduciary
principles never have and never will preclude all attempts at private

advantage by a partner.

64

The threat of dissolution is indeed

161. Her alternative is to dissolve and to seek recovery for the "misappropriated" asset.
This is problematic because the asset A seeks to capture is elusive.
162. Consider, for example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Cude v. Couch. See
supra discussion in note 158. In that case, the dissolution was rather clearly for the purpose of
eliminating a partner. Concluding that the objecting partner had not been harmed, the
majority reasoned that the "price offered at a public sale is the best indication of an item's
worth." 588 S.W.2d at 556. Ignored was the fact that, in buying the liquidated assets, the
dissolving partner was effectively able to secure without payment the removed partner's
portion of goodwill. This point was not lost on the dissent. Id. at 557 (Henry, J., dissenting).
163. Page v. Page, 55 Cal.2d 192, 195, 359 P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 646 (1961)
(quoting and reaffirming the principle stated in pre-U.P.A. opinions).
164. Consider Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal. Rptr.
180 (1983). In Rosenfeld, two partners in a law firm dissolved the partnership and established
their own firm. Prior to the dissolution, the firm, through the two partners, had rendered
substantial pre-trial services for a client, incurring significant expenses in the process. As the
trial date approached, and as attention was focused on a potentially huge settlement, the two
partners demanded a reallocation in their favor of partnership income. They threatened to
withdraw from the firm if the reallocation was not made, although it was unclear whether any
adjustment in income would have satisfied these individuals. The reallocation was not made,
and the partners withdrew from the firm, taking the client with them. This presents a rather
simple "misappropriation" case, and the court correctly concluded that fiduciary
responsibilities would preclude partners from dissolving the firm in order to capture for
themselves fees for the work done largely during the partnership's life. Necessarily. a threat
to misappropriate assets in an attempt to reallocate partnership income is also culpable
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"adverse pressure," but it is the type of pressure that necessarily
prompts bargaining and re-ordering within partnerships. Rather than
attempting to force partners to conform to a standard that is neither
realistic nor desirable, emphasis should be placed on developing predictable and systematic standards to define unacceptable pursuit of
private advantage within partnerships. Existing standards are impossible to define, arbitrary in application, ineffective in the achievement
of their stated goals, and premature in their canonization of participants in partnerships.
V.

CONCLUSION

Much of partnership law remains unexplored, and the sacred
cow status of the field is paradoxical. Widespread generalizations on
such matters as the nature of a partnership agreement, the timing of
bargaining that takes place between partners, the role and efficacy of
statutory norms, the status of partners as fiduciaries, and limitations
inherent in the use of law to control the pursuit of advantage within
partnerships should be reevaluated. In light of the decision of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
revise the U.P.A., the time has come for the development of a broad
base of commentary on the important but neglected subject of partnership law.

conduct. The case thus differs from our scenario, where the threatened squeeze out is not for
the purpose of misappropriating the value of unfinished business; the asset pursued by A is but
a vague expectancy of future prosperity. However comforting the notion of applying fiduciary
principles to this type of situation, such a result would mark a radical departure from the far
more limited application of these principles to date.

